

THE METAPHYSICAL UNITY OF NATURE AND ‘BEING’:
THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE WORLDVIEWS OF FREUD AND HEIDEGGER

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Yes, the spirit is everything...mankind has always known that it possesses spirit; I had to show it that there are also instincts.

Sigmund Freud (Binswanger 1957: 81)

metaphysica naturalis in Dasein itself...the possibility that being is there in the understanding presupposes the factual existence of Dasein, and this in turn presupposes the factual extantness of nature...In *their unity* (my italics), fundamental ontology and metontology constitute the concept of metaphysics.

Martin Heidegger *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (1984: 155-8)

The philosophico-historical engagement of Freudian psychoanalysis with Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology, two of the most influential theories of meaning of the 20th century, is riddled with twists and ironies. First, it was Heidegger himself who, despite his immense antipathy toward Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, opened the door to such an engagement by underscoring Holderlin’s insight: ‘Intimate interrelatedness means the belonging together of the unfamiliar, the sway of strangeness...’ (Heidegger 2001: 266). Second, though they shared a great deal of cultural and philosophical heritage/goals, each inexorably rejected the historico-worldview of the other. Although Martin Heidegger was thirty-three years Sigmund Freud’s junior, they shared the same language, lived relatively close to one another, had been directly influenced by the philosophy of Franz Brentano and his Cartesian and Kantian heritage, formed close relationships with some of the same people (e.g., the Swiss psychoanalysts, Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss), and were both concerned with the development of psychoanalysis. Yet, they hardly ever engaged one another¹. Next, the two worldviews take themselves to be mutually exclusive and

¹ Heidegger did engage Freud, but only very late in his philosophical career in the Zollikon Seminars.

antagonistic, and yet they share some fundamental insights about the human condition and the universe (e.g. the lack of objective meaning in the universe, that a ‘theory of everything’ is impossible), each had a deep and abiding interest in unmasking the hidden dimensions of human existence (i.e. the inaccessible), each rejected contemporary metaphysical/epistemological positions, yet are concerned with the problem of the emergence of meaning, recognized the necessity for limited ‘comprehensive theories of human nature.’ Each sought to (a) develop holistic accounts of human existence; (b) proposed diagnoses for the affliction of contemporary humankind (Askay 2013); (c) proposed specific therapeutic means for enabling individuals who are having difficulty coping with the burden of existence to adjust and be more at home in the world, to be free from their pathologically constricted ways of relating by restoring to them the fullness of potentialities and thereby lead to the self-transformation of therapists and clients alike; and (d) challenge the science of their time, and to develop a new science of the human being to serve as the theoretical foundation for the application of psychotherapeutic practice. Finally, despite such mutual antipathy and being seen by many as holding incommensurable theoretical paradigms, Heidegger’s phenomenological perspective in the form of Daseinsanalysis, has been the most influential on the development of psychoanalysis around the world (Askay 2011a). Contemporary psychoanalysis has sought to freely synthesize insights from both Heidegger’s philosophy and psychoanalysis (Askay 2011a). To understand the genesis of the above and to what extent these positions are reconcilable, it will be useful to (1) summarize Freud’s and Heidegger’s respective theories of meaning; (2) delineate the critiques of each by the other; (3) describe those most influential and systematic positions which have sought to synthesize the two (i.e. Binswanger and Boss); (4) see how Freud and Heidegger reacted to them; (4) develop a positive critique of Heidegger’s position on human embodiment; (5) see what each approach has to offer the other despite their mutual antagonism; and (6) briefly describe contemporary developments in the reciprocal relationship of the two throughout the world.

Freudian metapsychological theory

Freud believed that as a unified science, psychoanalysis required a stable theoretical grounding in a biologically based theory of human nature i.e. his metapsychological theory (Freud SE XIV). Indeed, he conceived it to be crucially designed ‘to clarify and carry deeper the theoretical assumptions on which a psychoanalytic system could be founded’ (Freud SE XIV: 222n) without which no advance in knowledge would be possible (Freud SE XXIII). ‘Health,’ Freud held, can only be properly understood in metapsychological terms (Freud SE XXIV: 226n). Psychoanalysis, then,

would serve as a superstructure (of ideas/practices) constructed upon the biological infrastructure described by his metapsychological theory. The human body is granted unconditional authority in determining man's essential being. Freud's metapsychology, then, sought to provide an account of the organic grounding for the emergence of all possible meaning, including philosophy (Freud SE VI). In addition, though Freud was a confirmed empiricist, he thought it was necessary for his theory to transcend (hence 'meta') the limits of pure science in order to make accessible such non-empirical psychical processes as the 'Unconscious' (Freud SE XIV). Indeed, the Unconscious served as an indispensable cornerstone for the foundation of psychoanalysis (SE XVIII) Freud considered the assumption of the Unconscious necessary because we could not otherwise make sense of the huge number of gaps in our everyday consciousness that suddenly emerge without our knowing their origins (e.g. mental slips, dreams, latent memories, etc) (Freud SE XIV). Such gaps are only rendered intelligible, he believed, once we interpolate between them unconscious acts. Freud's psychoanalytic technique was a method for retracing directly experienced conscious thoughts back to their previously inaccessible origins. Such a process intrinsically involved another cornerstone concept of psychoanalysis: 'repression'. 'Its essence lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance' (ibid). Freud asserted that 'no one forgets anything without some secret reason or hidden motive' (Freud SE IX: 22). Another major irony is that for this reason, Freud may be said to have repressed the origins of his own original theory of repression (Askay and Farquhar 2006: 98) and that forgetting is 'determined by unconscious purposes' (Freud SE VI: 169). One task of therapy, then, was to unmask these occurrences in order to liberate the analysand. For Freud, the analyst's successes in doing so served to confirm the existence of the unconscious.

Freud explicitly defined his metapsychology as 'a method of approach according to which every mental process is considered in relation to three coordinates...as dynamic, topographic, and economic' (Freud SE XIV: 167). All three provide perspectives which are indissolubly interrelated. Topographically, the mental apparatus is a composite, structural instrument composed of an 'id', an 'ego', and a 'superego'². While the ego and super-ego operate within consciousness and unconsciousness, the processes of the id are exclusively unconscious (thereby unorganized) and hence operate outside the function of time (Freud SE VI). Since the ego originates and develops

² Freud had developed an earlier topographic model (conscious/preconscious/unconscious) (Freud SE XIV: 180-5), superseded later by the structural view (Freud SE XXIII: 156)

from the id, most of mental activity occurs on the level of unconsciousness. Since the id gains more strength in sleep, and they serve as the guardians of sleep (Freud SE VI), '[t]he interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind' (Freud SE V: 608). The dynamic standpoint is one which derives all psychic processes from the conflicting interplay of forces which are originally in the form of instincts, and hence have an organic origin. Indeed, 'the deepest essence of man is instinctual impulse...which directs him to the satisfaction of certain primal needs', and 'the most important and most obscure element of psychological research'. They are represented mentally as images or ideas with an affective charge. Freud held that human instincts form two basic groups: 'the ego instincts' (concerned with self-preservation) and 'the object instincts' (directed toward the external world). Underlying them, were 'Eros' (libidinal energies) and 'Thanatos' (the death instinct). Eros as a unifying force seeks to combine what is lost, while Thanatos, as a destructive force, seeks to dissolve (Freud SE XX). All life seeks the ultimate tension-reduction i.e. to return to the inorganic state from which it emerged (Freud SE XXII). The economic viewpoint assumes that the mental representations of the instincts have an affective charge of definite quantities of energy, and that it is the purpose of the mental apparatus to prevent any occlusion of these energies, thus maintaining the excitations at a minimal level. The mental processes, then, are incipiently directed by the pleasure-principle, but in the course of development they submit to modification upon engagement with an external world, thus complying the reality-principle i.e. the delay of instinctual gratification.

The origin of these three coordinates are indissolubly interwoven. The 'id' is the 'true psychical reality'. As the original part of the personality, it is 'dark and inaccessible', 'a cauldron full of seething excitations...it is filled with energy reaching it from the instincts, but it has no organization, produces no collective will' (Freud SE XXII: 73) and represents the inner world of subjective experience and has no knowledge of or contact with external objective reality. It serves as the reservoir of psychic energy, furnishing all fuel for the various psychical systems, and derives its energy from the corporeal processes (Freud SE XX). Operating by the pleasure-principle, the id seeks to reduce tension in the organism to a comfortably low-level accomplishing this through the primary process i.e. by forming an image of the desired object that will reduce the tension e.g. wish fulfillment in dreams. Since the mere formation of an image of the desired object is unable to reduce tension by itself, a secondary process arises in the biological organism: the ego. It is able to distinguish between the images of the subjective reality of the id and the entities of the objective external reality, the ego is able to match the image of the desired object with real one

existing in the external world and thereby reduces tension. Hence, operating through the secondary process, the ego obeys the reality-principle. As executive of the personality, its primary function is to act as a rational mediator to bring about a harmony among the forces and influences being exerted between the instinctual desires of the organism and its environmental conditions. The ego determines which instincts will be satisfied, where, how, and when, while avoiding retribution from the external world. Subsequently, through conflict and experience with the external world, a 'superego' develops given the awareness that there are other humans, which seeks to inhibit gratification of the id's instinctual impulses, to persuade the ego to substitute moral goals for them, and to strive for the internalization of family values and social/cultural rules. Finally, Freud held that this entire metapsychological process is, metaphysically speaking, deterministic (Freud SE VI). All events happen in compliance with the principle of cause and effect - free will is a mere illusion (Freud SE VI; SE XVII). All human psychological activities are seen as ultimately traceable to somatic processes, which, given their material physicochemical nature, are governed by the causal laws of nature. These somatic processes, which ground the instincts are determined by the organism's physical environment and hereditary structure (Freud SE XII; SE XIV). Anything outside this causal chain is literally meaningless.

Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenological ontology

First and foremost, Heidegger's early philosophy is ontological because it focuses upon the question: 'What does it mean to be "Dasein"?' 'Being-*open* to what is present is the fundamental characteristic of being human' (Heidegger 2001: 73, 121; 1962: 176). It does so in contrast to anthropological-psychological theories which serve as sciences of human nature comprised of the 'corporeal, en-souled, and spiritual' aspects in which 'human beings appear to be not only creatures of nature, but also creatures that act and create...Man's abilities and obligations are based...on fundamental attitudes ...which we call "worldviews" - the "psychology" of which delimits the whole of the science of man...present in it are...the somatic, biology,...psychoanalysis which treat man as an object to be investigated and ask thereby 'What is man?' (Heidegger 1990: 146ff). Man should never be understood as a mere *thing* to be scientifically studied. Dasein is a presupposed interrelated set of lived structural processes which makes possible the emergence of meaning in Dasein's existence. As such Dasein is a field of meaning (i.e. as Being-in-the-world) in which it relates to what it encounters, others, and itself. 'To exist as Dasein means to hold open a domain through its capacity to receive-perceive the significance of things that are given to it and that address it by virtue of its own "clearing"' (Heidegger 2001: 4). It means standing outside

oneself into the open region of being in which beings can come to presence (Heidegger 2001). Hence, the fact of Dasein's own existence becomes an issue for it: Why does 'the world' even exist? Why bother to exist at all given the burdensome nature of existence? Ultimately, Dasein has no grounding, and yet serves as the foundation for all meaning. It is also pivotal to understand that Heidegger believes that psychology, biology etc are grounded in the fundamental ontology of an analytic of Dasein, *even if not entirely* (Heidegger 1962). Though Heidegger's goal was not to engage in a 'philosophical anthropology' which would fill out the superstructure constructed upon such a foundational analytic of Dasein (Heidegger 1962: 71-6).

Heidegger's method is 'phenomenological' (Heidegger 1962: 49ff; 2001: 110, 131-2, 197-8) because it offers a descriptive analysis of the universal and necessary structures presupposed for the possibility of any meaningful human experience. For example, it shows what must be presupposed in order to engage in any theoretical enquiry in the first place. By means of it, we move from an implicit everyday understanding of what it means to be as Dasein to an explicit, ontological understanding. While doing so, distortions and concealments are stripped away.

It is 'hermeneutical' (Heidegger 1962: 62f; 2001: 120, 125, 223) because it methodologically understands itself intrinsically as an interpretive process of human experience as it occurs within an overall historical flow and context i.e. it is concerned with the interpretation of Dasein's interpretation of the world. That is, human experience is the text to be interpreted.

Based on the above unified approach, Heidegger carefully drew the following distinctions (Heidegger 2001: 125, 188ff, 305-6) between what may be called his 'Analytic of Dasein' (levels 1 and 2) and 'Psychiatric Daseinanalysis' (levels 3 and 4):

1. Analytic of Dasein: the analysis, conducted in *Being and Time* (hereafter referred to as Heidegger 1962), of the ontological structure (existentialia) of Dasein.
2. Daseinanalysis: a regional ontology (Heidegger 1990: 148) that include actual, concrete illustrations of the above ontological structure from a psychological point of view.
3. Daseinanalyse: a description of concrete existential experiences on the level of everyday 'anthropology'/'psychology'.

- a. Normal anthropology
 - b. Daseinanalytic pathology
4. Concrete Daseinanalyse: a description of specific examples of actual individuals in their various modifications of being-in-the-world, care, and temporality.
- a. Normal
 - b. Pathological

Heidegger argues that levels 3 and 4 as ontical are grounded in levels 1 and 2 as ontological. Psychology/biology, then, are grounded in fundamental ontology. There is no separation between them.

Freud's reaction to Heidegger's philosophy

Freud minimally had at least some acquaintance with Heidegger's philosophy via his lifelong friendship with Ludwig Binswanger. Freud read Binswanger's lecture 'Freud's Conception of Man in Light of Anthropology' in which Binswanger argued that 'man is not only mechanical necessity and organization...His existence is understandable only as being-in-the-world, as the projection and disclosure of world - as Heidegger so powerfully demonstrated' (Binswanger 1963: 167). Freud's response to it was characteristically dismissive: 'Naturally...you have failed to convince me' (Binswanger 1957: 96). The reason for this reaction was the profound ambivalence Freud held toward philosophy (Askay 2006). He said he admired its spirit and insights (Freud 1954; Jones 1953: vol. 3; Nunberg and Federn 1962: vol. 1), and yet ultimately denigrated it as 'useless' (Freud 1990: 52). Given the latter, he would have no doubt rejected Heidegger's philosophy for its being (a) unnecessarily obscure and abstract language/nature (Nunberg and Federn 1962: vols 1 and 2); (b) contrived endeavor to construct a complete, coherent, and comprehensive system with one overriding hypothesis as 'unsound philosophy' (Freud SE XXII: 158); and (c) propensity for being unnecessarily 'speculative' (Jones 1953: vol. 1: 29) and replacing the scientific *Weltanschauung* (as the sole road to knowledge) with 'some kind of mysticism' (Freud SE XXII: 175). Furthermore, Freud held that, contra Heidegger, metapsychology grounds and makes possible all meaning, including philosophy itself (Binswanger 1957 99).

Heidegger's criticism of Freudian psychoanalysis

During the first half of the 20th century Freudian psychoanalysis was spreading across the European continent as the major intellectual influence of the era. As a 'form of science', it had become the rage, the new religion. As such, it was being taken as a substitute for philosophy (Petzet 1993: 49). In light of this threat, Heidegger's reaction was that a 'call to arms' was necessary to stem the tide of Freud's rallying edict that 'the intellect - scientific spirit/reason - establish a dictatorship in the mental life of man' (Freud SE XXII: 171). As such, it constituted a general critique of naturalism in the human sciences (Heidegger 2001: 26-30). At stake, he thought was the potential loss of our very humanity. The critical point was to counter the biological reductionism of Freudian libido theory (Heidegger 2001: 85). Hence, he enthusiastically accepted Medard Boss' invitation to introduce 'a new way of thinking' to groups of psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, etc. at the latter's home in Zollikon, Switzerland (1959-69) to break the hold of 'the dictatorship of scientific thinking' (Heidegger 2001: 274).

Heidegger's global reaction to Freud's psychoanalysis was one of a powerful philosophical (or more specifically, an ontological) dyspepsia. First, Heidegger rejected any endeavor to separate the concrete descriptions of human existence from philosophical reflection as a 'great self-deception'. To do so is a disaster, because this is to separate concrete descriptions of human existence 'from the ontological meaning which sustains them' (Heidegger 2001: 274). Freud was simply oblivious to the question of what it means to be as Dasein, and the ontological priority of 'the clearing,' as well as the true ontological characteristics of human beings (Heidegger 2001: 228, 282). Second, in light of its philosophical presuppositions (see below), psychoanalysis uncritically applied itself to domains inappropriate to its ontological commitments and methodology i.e. human existence (Askay and Farquhar 2006: 192-202, 212-23). Heidegger: 'Freud's metapsychology is the application of Neo-Kantian philosophy to the human being' (Heidegger 2001: 260). The latter claims that everything is grounded in physiology. And this is grounded in Cartesian 'thing-ontology' which is inappropriately applied to human existence (Heidegger 1962: 128-34). Heidegger simply could not believe that so 'gifted a man' as Freud could, in his theory, conceptually reduce human beings to being nothing more than a biological set of drives, urges, wishes i.e. to an object to be scientifically investigated (Heidegger 2001: 172f; Hoeller 1988: 9). By doing so Freud made it impossible for his metapsychology to account for the emergence of meaning. Freud's account merely presupposes Dasein's interrelations as Being-in-the-world as 'care' (Heidegger 2001: 173, 217-9). Contra Freud, philosophy, then, not only

grounds psychoanalysis (as a form of scientism), it makes it possible as a form of inquiry in the first place (Heidegger 2001: 200).

In light of the philosophical presuppositions of his metapsychological theory (see below), Heidegger argued that Freud made some highly questionable assumptions with regard to the nature and function of physical and psychical processes. First, he assumed that both domains operated in the same mechanical way (Heidegger 2001) and that all processes are ultimately grounded in somatic processes (forces) (Heidegger 2001). The result, he claimed, was that both the physical and psychical were considered to be involved in a continuous nexus of causal relations (Heidegger 2001). From that he inferred that everything is necessarily subject to reductionistic, scientific analysis (Heidegger 2001), and everything that exists is therefore measurable (Heidegger 2001). Thus, Freud held that psychical life is completely explainable (Heidegger 2001) in causal terms. However, since no ‘uninterrupted explainability’ appeared in consciousness, Freud found it necessary to (a) ‘invent the unconscious’ (Heidegger 2001: 319); (b) resort to the hypothesis of ‘unconscious purposes’ as explanations (Heidegger 2001: 214c) mistakenly construct the idea of ‘unconscious motivation’ (Heidegger 2001: 233); and (d) conflate ‘cause’ and ‘motive’ (Heidegger 2001: 25f).

According to Heidegger, aside from the fact that Freud offered no arguments in support of these assumptions, Freud’s ‘erroneous theory’ (Heidegger 2001: 282) failed on scientific grounds i.e. it neglected to satisfy the requirements of its own methodological criteria. In spite of his allegiance to the scientific *Weltanschauung* of his time, Freud, for example, resorted to empirically unverifiable presuppositions and nonempirical concepts (e.g. ‘the unconscious’, ‘the instincts’, etc (Heidegger 2001: 218-9). Moreover, he failed to offer an adequate account of the mind/body connection and the transformation of the non-material into the ‘bodily-material’ (Heidegger 2001: 294) and even what ‘the psychical’ is as a metaphysical being.

Heidegger’s insistence on a fundamental ontological grounding for any inquiry into the being of *Dasein*, of course, is what set him apart from Freudian psychoanalysis most fundamentally. This is why he staunchly refused any convergence with Freudian psychoanalysis. For Heidegger, Freud operated exclusively on the ontical level and was utterly oblivious to the ontological dimension of human existence.

Binswanger's attempt at a synthesis of Heidegger and Freud

Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) was a pivotal, historical figure who knew many of the major thinkers of his age, and as a result served as the first catalyst for a synthesis of psychoanalysis and phenomenology. He was introduced to Freud by Jung in 1907 (Jones 1953) and was among the few to have developed a lifelong friendship/correspondence (1907-1938) with him (Fichtner 2003), despite his coming to hold grave reservations about Freud's theory and its lack of an adequate philosophical grounding (Binswanger 1957). He had met Husserl, and engaged in a series of meetings/correspondences with Heidegger (Fichtner 2003; Spiegelberg 1972).

As a psychiatrist, Binswanger had tergiversated about the strengths and weaknesses of Freudian psychoanalysis and its role in his thinking throughout his career (Binswanger 1957). He was especially struck by his observation that there was an interconnection between his study of hermeneutics in human sciences and their relations to Freud's interpretative technique 'of unmasking' (Binswanger 1963: 151), in which he concluded that Freud was the first to have founded hermeneutics on experience, in which he sought to interpret the hidden meaning of presenting symptoms (Binswanger 1957), and thereby 'the first to lift the veil from the riddle of the sphinx known as neurosis' (Binswanger 1963: 151). Next, in his study of Husserl's phenomenology he had come to adopt his conception of 'intentionality' which he believed effectively bridged the gap in the subject/object dichotomy which he saw as the 'fatal defect' of psychology and philosophy (May 1958: 193). Indeed, Binswanger's first book, *An Introduction to the problems of General Psychology* (1922), is grounded in Husserl's phenomenology. For Binswanger, Heidegger's ontology had added yet another dimension to Husserl's phenomenology (Binswanger 1942), through his notion of the unity of Dasein (as 'world' - as the unique source of meaning is the unique source of being) (Binswanger 1942-55: 193, Vol. 1; 1963: 206). Indeed, Binswanger put Heidegger's Analytic of Dasein to the test more than any other psychoanalyst by applying it to detailed case studies (Binswanger 1933; 1957; May 1958).

Given all of the above, Ludwig Binswanger is credited with being the first to recognize the complementary relationship between Freud's psychoanalysis and (a) Husserl's constitutive phenomenology (see Askay and Farquhar 2006: 170-90 for the largely unrecognized overlap in Freud's and Husserl's approaches); and (b) Heidegger's early philosophy (Binswanger 1957), and the need for a 'phenomenological anthropology' grounded in Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology' (May 1958: 191; Binswanger 1994; Binswanger 1963: 211) i.e. the 'Analytic of Dasein'

(Heidegger, 2001: 125). Binswanger claimed that since it focused on Dasein's immediate everyday existence (i.e. the 'ontical level') his form of Daseinanalysis would serve as the appropriate foundation for psychiatry (and psychoanalysis) as a science by explicating the fundamental forms of human psychology/anthropology (Binswanger 1963: 150; Binswanger 1942) as well as 'actually appearing forms and configurations of existence' (May 1958: 192).

Binswanger held that phenomenology shows the possibility that our ideas may themselves be an effect of natural forces which we do not understand. Hence, like Husserl, Binswanger did not question the existence of the unconscious and an impersonal id (May 1958). Though he subsequently modified his understanding of it in a 'deeper and less and less defined as merely the opposite of consciousness' in which the opposition 'recedes into the background in the context of Heidegger's Being-in-the-world' (Binswanger 1957: 64). Yet, he held that Freud's concept of the Unconscious always remained absolutely essential to the conduct of psychotherapeutic practice. For Binswanger, the unconscious represents the Dasein in only one of its 'existentials', that of 'thrownness'. Thus, for him, the unconscious is a being (not an existence) (May 1958). Such an idea he thought is at most complementary to phenomenological Daseinanalysis. Reciprocally, Binswanger saw his Daseinanalysis, along with the approaches of Husserl and Heidegger, as an effort to complement and correct the view of human experience in Freudian theory. Early on Binswanger asserted that Freud's doctrine of *homo natura* - which reduced man almost exclusively to the mechanistic, biological world (thrownness) (Freud SE I; Binswanger 1963) exclusively viewed 'man as nature' (Binswanger 1963: 150, 154); his doctrine of the Unconscious views the essence of consciousness as that which is essentially in the Cartesian realm of the *res extensa* - oversimplified and constricted human reality (Binswanger 1963). For example, Binswanger rejected Freud's 'monstrous' reduction of love from the Eros instinct (Binswanger 1942: 234-5). The *whole* person is lost in such a preconceived approach. While retaining the valuable insights of psychoanalysis, he sees his own 'anthropological' analysis as something that can broaden them. Later Binswanger discovered that Freud's conception of nature was much deeper than that of scientific naturalism, nature being something which Freud approached with a sense of awe (Binswanger 1957). Freud's attitude toward nature was Greeklike reverence, he was awed by it, he respected it, and he sought to penetrate its mysteries...the unfathomable, unknowable mystery of nature (Sadler 1969; Askay and Farquhar 2006).

Binswanger's form of 'Daseinanalysis'³

Binswanger's version of Daseinanalysis differs from Heidegger's Analytic of Dasein in two fundamental ways. First, starting with *Being and Time* as a foundation (Binswanger 1963: 206-21), and seeking to 'improve upon it', Binswanger proceeded to develop a 'phenomenological anthropology' or his Daseinanalysis: the fundamental forms of human existence that focused on Dasein's immediate everyday experience. While doing so, he investigated the 'world-design' (Binswanger 1963: 31, 214f; May 1958: 203) (the unity of an actual manifestation of the a priori characteristics of Dasein is the Existential A Priori) of each individual. Dasein served as the background upon which the individual emerged. It is the pervasive pattern of an individual's modification of being-in-the-world which is occasionally dominated by one category a client developed which made possible various pathological experiences (Binswanger 1963; May 1958). In doing so he took himself to be ascertaining the very ground of existence that makes possible that particular dual mode of 'world design'. He thought that pathology occurs when one of the basic structural aspects of Dasein becomes predominant over the others. In his *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins* (Basic Forms of Knowledge and Human Dasein), Binswanger suggested Daseinsanalysis understands the particular individual patient's 'life-history as modifications of the total structure of the patient's being-in-the world' (Ruitenbeek 1962: 2) in which he investigates their 'thrownness' in terms of their biological world, the social world, and the possibilities of their self-world (May 1958: 196, 212). Focusing on the psychological categories (his existential a priori matrix) of how human Dasein is concretely experienced (as opposed to Heidegger's *ontological* level of focusing on the meaning of Being), if the patient finds herself closed off from the world and herself, then her existence is in a 'deficient mode of being'. She does not experience the world as possibility, but instead from a 'world view' that enables her to approach herself and world as a static and constricted actuality (Ruitenbeek 1962: 22; Binswanger 1963: 284f). The result was that the individual's existence is experienced as narrowed and unfree. This enables us 'to understand and describe the various psychoses and neuroses as specific deviations of the...transcendental, structure of man's humanity' (Ruitenbeek 1962: 19; May 1958: 194). 'Thus, [Daseins]analysis understands the task of psychotherapy to be the opening up of new structural possibilities to such altered existential processes' (Ruitenbeek 1962: 22).

³ For a more fully developed account of this section see Askay 2001: 304-7; 2011: 119-23.

A second fundamental way in which Binswanger differs from Heidegger's approach, is that he sees humans as being in an irreducible dual mode of existence: being-in-the-world as 'care' *and* as 'being-beyond-the-world' in 'love' (May 1958: 315; Binswanger 1963: 219). He understood 'love' as coexistence, as openness to we/our (Binswanger 1942: 21, 29-31; May 1958: 198), a transcendence of Dasein's finite world as spatial, temporal, and historical, a special at-homeness of lovers with one another (Binswanger 1942). In loving coexistence, we are fully engaged in an interdependent presence with the other which is rooted in our being, through it we could 'leap beyond' our own singular Dasein (Binswanger 1963: 170). Given this, Binswanger saw 'care' as at most a 'deficient' mode of authentic intersubjective reciprocity (Binswanger 1942: 113, 580; May 1958: 195). In general, Binswanger's primary objection to Heidegger's work was that it was too individualistic, and neglected to offer a sufficient account of the primordial social dimension of love in human existence that was more fundamental than Heidegger's concept of being-with others: that love had been abandoned by Heidegger to freeze in the cold outside of his project of being (Binswanger 1942). Here Binswanger allies with Buber's emphasis on the ontological primacy of the reciprocity of I and Thou (Binswanger 1942). In love, Binswanger thought, we transcend the concerns of everyday existence and participate in an 'eternal now'. In this way the individual transcends a singular mode of existence revealing a greater unity of being in his theory of reciprocal love (Binswanger 1942). Hence, humans are being-in-the-world-beyond-the-world as a new anthropological form of being.

Heidegger's critique of Binswanger's Daseinsanalysis⁴

Heidegger publicly repudiated Binswanger's use of his philosophy throughout the Zollikon Seminars. Boss once formulated Heidegger's opinion of Binswanger in the following way: 'too much reading and too little thinking' and he failed to 'digest' Heidegger's ideas. The differences between Daseinsanalysis and the analytic of Dasein were clear: 'for Binswanger, Being-in-the-world is one more characteristic of the ego, like perception, memory, etc' (Hoeller 2008: 45). Heidegger's critique of Binswanger's approach is best understood in the context of the goals of each thinker. On the one hand, the fundamental ontology of the Analytic of Dasein that Heidegger developed in *Being and Time* originally formed part of Heidegger's original project to inquire into the meaning of Being in general (Heidegger 1962). Hence, the primary question of *Being and Time*

⁴ For a fuller account of this section see Askay 2001: 304-7.

‘What does it mean to be Dasein?’ was merely on the way to such an understanding. On the other hand, Heidegger also recognized that his fundamental ontology could also help form the philosophical foundation for regional ontologies, such as a psychological form of Daseinanalysis (Heidegger 1990). Developing such a ‘psychiatric Daseinanalysis’, Binswanger, initially anyway, had as his goal. At first it appeared to Heidegger that Ludwig Binswanger had ostensibly provided the latter. Initially (1929-34), Heidegger’s reaction to Binswanger’s early work (Binswanger 1922, 1933) was positive and supportive describing it as ‘the feat [Binswanger has] accomplished in taking the step from the subject-object relation to being-in-the-world’ (Binswanger 1942-55 Vol 2: 340; cf. Heidegger 1962: 87). However, it was after Heidegger read his *Grundformen* (Binswanger’s ‘gigantic manuscript about eccentricity’ which Heidegger dubbed ‘very eccentric’ (Heidegger 2001: 245-6) that Heidegger thought it crucial to point out that Binswanger’s ‘psychiatric Daseinanalysis’ does *not* form a section of Heidegger’s ‘analytic of Dasein *as ontology*’ (Heidegger 2001: 125), but is solely an *ontic* (anthropological/psychological) investigation (Heidegger 2001: 120, 124; May 1958: 192), as well as ‘particular, factual Dasein’ (Heidegger 2001: 207). Heidegger was clear, ‘*it is simply impossible to conduct an investigation of a regional ontology such as psychology*’ (i.e. Binswanger’s ‘psychiatric Daseinanalysis’) ‘*independently from the question and understanding of Being*’ (Heidegger 1990: 167). The belief that he could is precisely what led Binswanger into a plethora of egregious confusions according to Heidegger.

First and foremost, Binswanger conflated levels 1 and 2 with levels 3 and 4 in the distinctions Heidegger drew above in the concept of ‘Daseinanalysis’. He had conflated the inquiry into the meaning of being in general (the question at the core of *Being and Time*) with an inquiry into the basic anthropological/psychological categories of everyday human beings (Heidegger 2001). While misinterpreting and conflating the ontological as something only ontic, he misses the fact that the ontological remains the determining factor of the factual itself (Heidegger 2001). Thus, Binswanger constructs his ‘existential apriori matrix’ e.g. ‘a projection of a world toward a [formal-ontical] “continuity” [of things present-at-hand]’⁵. To do so, is to ‘empty it of any factual [existential] content’ (Heidegger 2001: 206). In addition, ‘continuity’ is not a determination of an ontological world-projection, but merely shows itself in a different ontical way in beings which are disclosed within this world projection. Hence, he confuses the ontological world-projection

⁵ Heidegger might refer to this as a ‘meta-ontic’ level (Binswanger 1963: 125).

with the ontical beings disclosed in the world-projection, once again conflating the ontological with the ontical (Heidegger 2001).

Second, Heidegger held that in his endeavor to eliminate ‘fundamental ontology’ from ‘psychiatric Daseinanalysis’, Binswanger involves ‘a misunderstanding of the relationship between fundamental ontology and regional ontology, the latter of which is presupposed... in psychiatry as well’. ‘Fundamental ontology is *not merely* the general ontology for the regional ontologies, a higher sphere...suspended above (or a kind of basement beneath)...Fundamental ontology is that thinking which *moves within* the foundation of each ontology’ (my italics, Heidegger 2001: 190-1; 1962: 182f, 202f, 486-8)⁶. Heidegger goes even further: ‘None of these regional ontologies can abandon the foundation, least of all, the regional ontology of psychiatry...’ (Heidegger 2001: 190-1). Hence, there is no separation between the ontological and the ontical (Heidegger 2001); each is indissolubly rooted in the other (Heidegger 1962). Furthermore, Heidegger ultimately denied that his own analytic of Dasein in *Being and Time* was complete enough to serve as the basis of a philosophical anthropology anyway (Heidegger 2001: 125; 1962: 58).

Third, for Heidegger, Binswanger misinterprets Heidegger’s ontology as ‘solipsistic’ and ‘subjectivistic’ (Heidegger 2001: 116), and ‘seeks to overcome the subject/object split (what he dubbed the “cancer of psychiatry”) by correctly beginning with Being-in-the-world, and then going astray by letting subjectivity “transcend” from out of its separate self to the external world, yet he hasn’t the faintest idea how this is to be done’ (Heidegger 2001: 227). By isolating Da-sein (Heidegger 2001) as a subject (Heidegger 1990) he remains confined with an anthropological (psychological) representation of the human being (Heidegger 1962; 1990). Binswanger thereby ‘mutilates Da-sein from which its basic characteristic has been cut out and cut off’ (Heidegger 2001: 190). Seeing himself as continuing in the same philosophical tradition as Husserl and Kant (Heidegger 2001), Binswanger mistakenly sees Heidegger that way as well⁷. Though Husserl and Kant never asked ontological questions (Heidegger 2001). Binswanger simply failed to grasp

⁶ Nevertheless, this [being-in-the-world] is only that structure which be shown at the very *beginning* of fundamental ontology—but is not the only one, and above all, not the one which fundamental ontology has *solely* in view because it sustains Da-sein and its unfolding essence (Heidegger 2001: 188).

⁷ Heidegger ironically states: ‘[For Kant] the transcendental is the tracing back to a unity (synthesis) of the ontological possibility of the being of beings...the goal of “the analytic” is to expound the original unity of the function of the faculty of understanding...in the ontological sense, “the analytic” is...the articulation of the [a priori] unity of the composite structure’ (Heidegger 2001: 115 – Nov 23, 26, 1965). This is also in the concept of the ‘analytic of Dasein’ (Heidegger 1962; Binswanger 1963: 124n.)

Heidegger's notion of the understanding of being, the disclosedness (Heidegger 1962), 'the standing-within the clearing of being' (Heidegger 2001: 192). 'The clearing of being is not given at all in the immediate, ontic things of everyday [experiential], but we see it only in [reflective] thinking' (Heidegger 2001: 204). Binswanger, then, is precluded from even seeing Da-sein as Da-sein in the first place (Heidegger 2001). Since he did not have a genuine understanding of being, Binswanger's ontic analysis therefore blocks clear insight into the phenomenological hermeneutics of Dasein (see Heidegger 2001: 120; 1971; 1962: 61-63; Kiesiel 1993: 259-61, 373 concerning the origins of Heidegger's 'hermeneutic of facticity' in the early 1920's), and develops a wrong-headed interpretation of being-in-the-world.

Fourth, Binswanger entirely misunderstood the meaning of Heidegger's use of 'transcendence' (Heidegger 2001: 227). Taken as a characteristic of 'subjectivity' in Binswanger's analysis, 'transcendence' is isolated and convoluted as it is in Kant's and Husserl's versions (Heidegger 2001: 192). Instead,

Dasein transcends as the sustaining of the Da, which is the clearing of being and the basis of Dasein's relationship to being...It lets 'world' happen...it is the site of everything encountered...shaping a world, allowing being-as presence to come into view; indissolubly standing in the difference between being and beings, and safekeeping it.

Heidegger 2001: 192-4

'Da-sein [exists] as ecstatic stepping *beyond itself*, the clearing in and of itself' (Heidegger 2001: 195).

Finally, Binswanger did not really grasp the meaning of the understanding of being (as the constitution of Dasein) or Being-in-the-world, which prevented him from even getting to the question of the meaning of being in general (Heidegger 2001). For example, he completely missed that 'care' has an ontological sense, and that Heidegger is not concerned with offering a mere description on the everyday phenomena of Dasein e.g. melancholy (Heidegger 2001; 1990). As a result, Binswanger finds it necessary to supplement Heidegger's individualistic analysis of care (as he conceives it) with a gigantic treatise on love which covers Heidegger's neglect of the social dimension of human existence. Binswanger does not understand that 'care' encompasses the ontological structure of Being-with which makes the social dimension possible i.e. all the ways of

loving are grounded in Being-in-the-world as 'care' (Heidegger 2001: 151, 242) and thereby make them 'deeper and more comprehensive' (Heidegger 2001: 190). Furthermore, 'care is...the whole, unfolding essence of Da-sein, insofar as Da-sein is always already dependent on something showing itself to it [being]...' (Heidegger 2001: 227). Thus, the 'holding sway of the world' precludes the very possibility of Binswanger's 'being-beyond-the-world anyway' (Heidegger 2001: 286).

In summary, Binswanger's 'psychiatric Daseinanalysis' is not a part of the analytic of Dasein for Heidegger because it omits a consideration of: (1) wherein it is grounded and to which itself remains related; and (2) an approach to the 'understanding of being' which is the fundamental characteristic of Da-sein as such. These form the sole concern of *Being and Time* which Binswanger's account crucially overlooks (Heidegger 2001).

Interestingly enough, Binswanger himself later conceded the validity of some of Heidegger's criticisms i.e. that he had engaged in a 'fruitful misunderstanding' of it (Sadler 1969: 118). Most significantly, he characterized his work as *not* being an 'analytic of Dasein', but a 'phenomenological-anthropological analysis of love'. He granted that Heidegger's project was 'entirely different from his own, and he finally admitted in the preface to the 4th edition of the *Grundformen* that its aim had no pretense of being 'a rejoinder to *Being and Time* but was merely a phenomenology of love'. He then acknowledged that his 'fruitful misunderstanding' consisted of his understanding 'the existentialia not as...ontological, but merely in the sense of offering some most fruitful, categorical guidelines/clues to our inquiry' (Binswanger 1960: 258; Askay 2001: 304-8; Condrau 1998: 57-61). Hence, in the end, Binswanger conceded the soundness of Heidegger's primary criticism above. Having said the above, arguably this does not negate the value of Binswanger's work. It may still be understood as a valid and remarkably far-seeing supplementation of Heidegger's early thought (see Binswanger 1963: xix, 125; Sadler 1969: 118).

Boss' historical relationship to Freud, Binswanger and Heidegger

In 1925, Medard Boss (1903-1990), during his medical studies in Vienna, underwent a couple dozen of analytic sessions as Freud's analysand⁸. As part of proper protocol, Freud had insisted

⁸ At the author's home (Portland, Oregon) in 1989, Boss relayed this information as well as a story involving Freud's human warmth.

that Boss pay for the analytic sessions, and then afterwards would give him money for lunch since Boss was an impecunious student (see Askay 2011b). Boss had made the reasons for Freud's behavior earlier: 'The only appropriate gains were to be made through imposing a fee sufficient to represent a real financial sacrifice for the patient. Payment on this scale would help keep patients from using the therapeutic situation as a lifelong crutch' (Boss 1979: 163)⁹. Boss was a firm advocate of Freud's therapeutic practice, but, like Binswanger, came to have severe doubts about his metapsychology.

During World War II he encountered Heidegger's *Being and Time* and found it overwhelmingly challenging. Boss learned subsequently that as a consequence of intense questioning during the de-nazification process in Germany, Heidegger had experienced a mental collapse after the war, and had been treated by Dr. Gebssattel at a Badenweiler sanatorium (February-May 1946). During that time and subsequently he 'discussed many questions concerning the philosophical foundation of psychotherapy' with his therapist (see Ott 1993; Petzet 1993; and Askay 2011b). Boss first contacted Heidegger in 1946: 'Heidegger was in a bad way. The "shyness" Boss [spoke] about was certainly exacerbated by depression...' (Hoeller 2008: 46).

In 1947, increasingly dissatisfied with his own therapeutic approach and lack of understanding of *Being and Time*, Medard Boss contacted Heidegger to solicit help in providing a more adequate philosophical foundation for psychoanalytic therapy. Heidegger was immediately enthusiastic about the opportunity, 'the problems of psychopathology and psychotherapy regarding their principles interest me very much' (Heidegger 2001: 237). However, due to political and logistical constraints the Zollikon seminars (most of which were held in Boss' home) were not held until from 1959 to 1969. Heidegger conducted two three-hour seminars per week roughly three times per semester. In essence, these sessions amounted to 'crash courses' on the relevance and application of Heidegger's phenomenological method to psychotherapeutic concerns (Richardson 2008: 83-102). In these seminars, Heidegger extensively critically reflected upon and evaluated Freudian psychoanalysis for the first time.

The seminar participants were comprised of approximately 50-70 psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, therapists etc., most of whom were trained almost exclusively in science and had little or no

⁹ Spiegelberg is mistaken when he claimed that Boss didn't meet Freud (1972: 334).

philosophical training. In light of this context, Boss' description was particularly apt: 'it was if a man from Mars were visiting earth-dwellers in an attempt to communicate with them' (Heidegger 2001: xviii)¹⁰. Next, according to Boss: 'Heidegger hoped that...his thinking would escape the confines of the philosopher's study and become of benefit to wider circles, in particular to a large number of suffering human beings' (Hoeller 1988: 7, 12; Heidegger 2001: xi, xvii). Hence, Heidegger's, then, was a call to arms: 'There is the highest need for doctors who *think* and who do not wish to leave the field to scientific technicians' (Heidegger 2001:103).

Boss' historical relationship and vvaluation of Binswanger's Daseinanalysis

Having been a 'one-time student' of Ludwig Binswanger's and his writings, the latter introduced him to Heidegger's *Being and Time*, Medard Boss was stimulated to undertake a thorough study of Heidegger's work (Boss 1957; 1979; Hoeller 1988; Frie 1997). Up to the time he met Heidegger, he had considered Binswanger to be a 'competent interpreter of the Analytic of Dasein' (Hoeller 2008: 27). In 1949, in his *Meaning and Content of Sexual Perversions*, Boss had sought to show how individuals try to actualize a 'loving mode of being' - in love, man's whole existence is transformed. The irony here, of course, is that this is precisely the topical modification that Binswanger had suggested was an important supplement to Being-in-the-world which Heidegger had vituperatively rejected. Heidegger shared his critique of Binswanger with Boss which the latter unhesitatingly proceeded to adopt completely (Hoeller 2008), describing Binswanger's approach as unacceptably a 'Cartesian, subjectivistic and dualistic revision of the Analytic of Dasein and transcendence' (Boss 1957: 164; 1963: 32, 51; 1979: 71; Binswanger 1951: 6), and simply not concerned with therapeutic practice (Boss: 1957) (Footnote: However, to be fair, Binswanger did anticipate some of the most important of Boss' insights (which the latter did not acknowledge): (1) a major claim in Boss' Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis that there were two Freuds', qualitatively a practical one and quantitatively a theoretical one based on biology (Binswanger 1942-55: II; Boss 1963); (2) that transference/counter transference involves a genuine emotional experience between the analyst and analysand (Binswanger 1957; Boss 1963); (3) that Freudian practice necessarily involved the self-disclosure by the analysand (Binswanger 1963; Boss 1963); (4) Boss shared with Binswanger the idea that neurosis and psychosis in individuals originated from a constriction or blockage of their world openness. The idea is to make the patient

¹⁰ Given his infamous verbiage and the esoteric quality of his philosophy, this is probably not the first nor the last time that it will be suggested that Heidegger's philosophy seemed to be from another planet!

transparent in his/her own structure so that they could terminate such obstructions. For example, some individuals refuse a world relation through ‘bodily jamming’. Illness was understood as ‘constrictedness’ of relating; and (6) that bodily being is primordial to our existence (see below).

Boss’ proposal for a more adequate form of Daseinanalysis

Yet, in spite of Binswanger’s mistakes, Heidegger had no qualms about the development of a proper psychiatric Daseinanalysis (Heidegger 2001). He simply insisted that it must be done properly. Upon meetings and discussions with Boss, it was clear to Heidegger that Boss was ‘the only therapist to really understand his ideas’ and apply them in the appropriate manner to psychoanalysis and therapy (Hoeller 2008: 46). Heidegger and Boss became close friends and inter-disciplinary colleagues which is evident from their work together in the Zollikon Seminars at Boss’ home in Switzerland and their correspondence. As a result, Boss had the open support of Heidegger in the development of his form of Daseinanalysis, and Heidegger’s influence is clearly reflected in Boss’ books: 1949, 1957, 1975. Indeed, Heidegger helped Boss compile chapter two of: ‘Outline of Analysis of Dasein’ (Boss 1963: 49) and Heidegger edited the galley proofs of Boss’ magnum opus (Boss 1979).

During the next few decades, Boss became the first psychotherapist to develop and found a truly systematic and existential Daseinanalytic therapy. By placing his emphasis upon unique human ‘perceptive world openness’ - the fundamental concept of Heidegger’s description of human existence as the clearing of being, Boss underscored that humans ‘exist’ only insofar as they relate to (i.e. disclose and perceive) others, self, and world (Boss 1963: 34f). This presupposes the even more fundamental understanding that there is anything at all (as opposed to nothing at all) as ‘an immediate and primary awareness of “Beingness as such”’ (Boss 1963: 35ff). ‘For man is the realm of lumination claimed by Being-ness, the realm into which particular beings may come forth into their being, shine forth, and appear as the phenomena which they are’ (Boss 1963: 285). They are a fundamental ‘being-together’ as an indissoluble engagement of our personal worlds which serves as the foundation upon which all specialized techniques for understanding others are predicated. People are world-disclosing (clearing/illuminating) in their very being and hence humans and ‘world’ (the showing forth of ‘meaning’) require each other for their very being and manifestation (Boss 1963: 47-8). Each individual’s ‘world-relations’ are an individual’s own ways of being human, of world-openness. Hence, following Heidegger, Boss understands the primary goal of his level of Daseinanalysis is ‘to adhere to the immediately given objects and phenomena

of man's world...to let the phenomena speak for themselves and show us their essence and meanings' (Boss 1963: 59), 'to remain as open as possible and to listen and see how man appears in his full immediacy' (Boss 1963: 32). In it he sought to show how the patient's symptoms reflect the context of his/her own specific modes of existence as reflected in the universal and necessary structures of Being which make them possible. For Boss, neurosis/psychosis originated in a constriction of 'blockage' of an individual's world openness; illness is understood as a constrictedness (a 'narrowing of experience') of relating. For example, some individuals refuse a 'world relation' through a 'bodily-jamming' (Boss 1963: 144). The primary idea is to enable the individual patient to be transparent in his/her own structure so they could end such obstructions.

Boss agreed that Freud shared the idea of 'the pervasive meaningfulness of all mental phenomena' (Boss 1963: 85). However, he argued (like Heidegger) that: 'any attempt to prove the reality of the unconscious by the useful and practical effects of this concept is more than dubious' (Boss 1963: 89). He thereby rejected Freud's reasoning for the 'legitimacy' (see above) of a concept of the Unconscious, that it 'does not further the genuine understanding of understanding human possibilities...' (Boss 1963: 92; 1979: 137). Daseinanalysis, Boss thought, could elucidate immediate experience without having to go beyond it (Boss 1963) '...some phenomenon out there in the open realm of my world is not for the time being thematically available to me' (Boss 1979: 135). This mirrored precisely Heidegger's own position on the 'unconscious' (Heidegger 2001: 168-70). However, Boss credits Freud here with

...grasping a realm fundamentally important to the Daseinanalytic understanding of man...as on the way to the concealed, to concealment as such. Without concealment and darkness, man would not be the world-disclosing being that he is.

Boss 1963: 100-1

In alignment with the above, Boss said '[he] couldn't believe [his] eyes' when he discovered a passage in *Being and Time* that he thought could have been written by Freud himself in his therapeutic works (Holler 2008). Heidegger drew a distinction between what he called 'intervening care' and what might be called 'anticipatory care' (Heidegger 1962 158-9). Briefly, 'intervening care' occurs when the therapist 'leaps in' to the analysand's life, and 'takes over' or seeks (either knowingly or unwittingly) to make decisions for how they are to live their existence. This is what Heidegger refers to as a negative or inauthentic mode of relating between Daseins

and is to be avoided whenever possible. In this mode, one Dasein can become dominated and dependent upon the other. By contrast, there is a positively valued kind of concern, an authentic care, in which one Dasein ‘leaps ahead’ of another Dasein’s existence, explores their possibilities with them, ‘helps the other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and *free for* it’ (Heidegger 1962: 159). Meanwhile, doing all of this without trying to make their choices for them, nor trying to vicariously lead their ‘life’ for them. Another dimension of this, is to enable the client to leap into the ‘letting be’ worldview which Heidegger’s Analytic of Dasein indicates. This helps the therapist see a patient’s deliberate effort to disclose herself to others as a symptom that the patient’s primary openness is being blocked (Scott 1975). The problem is to cease to block the fundamental interrelatedness which already there as a primordial given of our being. For Boss, intervening vs. anticipatory care is a crucial distinction for a genuine therapeutic process (Boss 1963). As therapists, Freud and Boss were each opposed to intervening care, generally and thought that it should be rarely used. This they believed could all too easily happen, for instance, where the analysand might simply uncritically adopt the jargon of psychoanalysis in his own case, or that analysts may uncritically interpret analysands exclusively using psychoanalytic theory (Freud SE XVII: 165-6; XVIII: 74, 86-90), and thereby unreflectively leap in and make choices for their patients.

Finally, there is a related danger to the above. Boss argues that the ‘why’ questions of psychoanalysis often come off as ‘useless commands to dredge up past causes’ and are occasionally mistaken for prohibitions/justification - e.g. Why are you still doing this? (e.g. that a patient verbalize a reasonable, cognitive explanation of his behavior). This is nothing less than a form of intervening care. By way of contrast, the ‘Why not?’ questions of Daseinanalysis, Boss suggests, open the client up and encourage her to ever greater tests of daring while exploring what they have been avoiding (Boss 1963). For example: ‘Why not allow yourself to consider this new possibility which you seem to put so much energy into avoiding?’ The idea is to convey the possibility of a richer and varied existence for the patient and thereby engage in authentic anticipatory care (Boss 1979: 279-80).

Boss believed that the Freudian therapeutic processes of transference/countertransference should be taken seriously as genuine emotional experiences by both the therapist and patient. For example, ‘the child-like modes of behavior which sprout for the first time in the analysand-analyst relationship should be valued as the precious starting points from which all future developments

will arise...the analysand's being-himself will mature into ever more differentiated forms of relating if and only if the more primitive forms of relating are first permitted to unfold themselves full' (Boss 1963: 241). In a related vein, 'The analyst must be mature enough to permit the patient to unfold in an atmosphere of complete security...' (Boss 1963: 245).

In light of the above, Boss' Daseinanalysis paved the way for a more holistic and unified psychotherapy. In 1970, with Heidegger's encouragement and blessing, Boss established the Swiss Society for Daseinanalysis in Zurich, and in 1984, the Swiss Professional Federation for Daseinanalysis was founded in Zurich. All of this served to help fulfill Heidegger's desire that 'his philosophical insights would not be confined merely to the philosopher's quarters but also might benefit many more people, especially people in need of help' (Heidegger 2001: xvii).

Boss on Freud's 'philosophically split-personality'

In his primary work, *Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis*, Boss essentially argued that there were two distinct 'Freuds': the therapeutic practitioner and the metapsychological theorist. Boss claimed that when he cajoled Heidegger into reading some of Freud's writings in these two domains that he immediately saw the crass contradiction in their philosophical positions while remaining 'conciliatory' only to Freudian therapeutic practice (Hoeller 1988: 9). We should note that other than Boss' claim here, there is no evidence in Heidegger's writings that he drew this distinction. One might wonder how Freud himself would have reacted to Boss' contention. Freud would have indisputably rejected Boss' claim. Why? For him, as we have seen above, psychoanalysis as a whole was a unified science: a therapeutic method which was grounded in his metapsychological theory (Freud SE XX; XVIII; see Askay 2001 and 2006 for fuller accounts). Psychoanalysis was merely a superstructure which, through scientific progress, would be shown to have its ultimate foundation in an organic infrastructure (Freud SE XIV). Hence, for Freud, there is no split.

At any rate, Boss retained a nearly complete allegiance to Freud's psychotherapeutic practice (Boss 1963) but utterly rejected his 'metapsychological theory' (Freud's 'philosophically split-personality'). By adopting Heidegger's analytic of Dasein, Boss believed that he could ontologically ground Freudian practice while showing the inadequacy of the Freud's theory (Boss 1963). In *Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis*, Boss sought to show the intrinsic harmony between Freudian therapy and Heidegger's analytic Dasein, and re-evaluated Freud's theory from a

Heideggerean perspective. He argues that Freud's therapeutic approach and Heidegger's approach share certain fundamental terms: 'understanding', 'meaningfulness', 'openness', 'truths', and 'freedom' and then infers that they are in an 'intrinsic harmony' as to 'the tacit understanding of man' (Boss 1963: 61ff.) Boss then claims that 'The intrinsic harmony of psychoanalytic therapy and analysis of Dasein becomes particularly evident in their common underlying conception of freedom' (Boss 1963: 67ff.), for example. Boss claimed that Freud's therapeutic writings 'abound with references to freedom' which is shared by Heidegger's ontology. Furthermore, Boss claimed that Freud himself held the 'intervening' vs. 'anticipatory' care distinction that Heidegger drew (Hoeller 2008: 23-4; Heidegger 2001: xvii) above (Boss 1963).

There are major problems with Boss' contention however. They include: (1) Boss offers merely three specific references to Freud's use of 'freedom' (Boss 1963: 67); (2) Boss' contention is in direct opposition to the standard interpretation of Freud as a strict determinist, but each of Boss' examples (he thinks), can be more plausibly read in line with that interpretation (cf. Freud SE VI: 242). (2) Arguably, a more plausible alternative to the standard interpretation is to read Freud as seeking to overcome the narrow constraints of the science of his time by adhering to Schopenhauerean compatibilism (cf. Askay 2006). (3) It is difficult to see how Boss avoids the problem that Freud uses 'freedom' on an everyday (or ontic) level, while Heidegger insists that they not be separated from their rootedness in fundamental ontology. Heidegger would point out that Freud was utterly oblivious to the more primordial and original ontological meaning of freedom as the open, clearing in which freedom emerges (Heidegger 2001; 1977; 1992), and in which the more everyday, existential sense of freedom is grounded and makes possible (Heidegger 1962). (4) A major difficulty occurs in Boss' claim above that Freud the therapist both recognized and practiced the intervening vs. anticipatory notion of Care Heidegger drew. From Freud's point of view, psychoanalysis is a unified science, and hence is grounded in metapsychology. To be sure, Freud did explicitly hold that 'we cannot accept...that psycho-analysis should place itself in the service of a particular outlook on the world and should urge this upon the patient to ennoble him. I would say that this is only tyranny..' (Freud SE XVII: 165-6). In addition, Freud observed that an individual often permits him/herself to be absorbed in an anonymous group mentality. 'When this occurs one willingly forfeits his/her distinctness, freedom and its concomitant responsibility' (Freud SE XVIII: 74, 86-90). Heidegger would also point out that because Freud so rigidly adhered to the scientific *Weltanschauung* which underlies his metapsychology, he in effect was using a particular philosophical worldview on his colleagues and patients. For Heidegger, this was just

another form of intervening tyranny!

In his highly influential psychiatric classic - *General Psychopathology* - Karl Jaspers raises a devastating critique of the attempt to ground any form of psychology (e.g. psychoanalysis) in Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology': 'I consider Heidegger's attempt to be a *philosophical error* in principle because it does not lead the student on to philosophise in his turn but offers him a total schema of human life as if it were knowledge...objective and discovered' (Jaspers 1963: 776-7). R. Askay asked Dr. Boss if he had ever been critical of Heidegger's fundamental ontology' and his response irreticently confirmed Jaspers' contention: 'How could I criticize him? He was a genius!'¹¹

From nature to Being: human embodiment

One of the primary places in which Freud and Heidegger may be plausibly said to have missed a primary opportunity to engage one another fruitfully is on the role of embodiment in human existence. Prima facie it would seem that they could not be further apart philosophically. Freud's primary focus was on grounding human existence in its biological nature, while Heidegger ultimately argued that 'human embodiment' is, at most, derivative from Dasein's Being-in-the-World. Yet, arguably the two can be shown to be mutually complementary i.e. though it is not generally recognized (especially by the thinkers themselves), each, at one time or another, took important steps toward the other.

Heidegger and the body

Heidegger was strongly criticized by Binswanger (Frie 1997) and Sartre (1956; Heidegger 2001) for neglecting the metaphysical importance of the body in *Being and Time*. His response in 1972 was: '...the bodily (*das Leibliche*) is the most difficult [to understand] and I was unable to say more at that time' (Heidegger 2001: 231; 1993: 243). Indeed, even in *Being and Time* and subsequently:

¹¹ One highly significant way in which Boss did in fact challenge Heidegger was on the issue of whether the Hindu perspective of Advaita Vedanta on the emergence of meaning was 'as adequate as' (Hoeller 2008: 36) (or ultimately, even 'different from') Heidegger's (see Heidegger 2001: 178-80; Boss 1979: 296). Also see *A Psychiatrist Discovers India*; Hoeller 2008: 29-31; 48ff). It is interesting to note that as Boss says: 'phenomena' is derived from the Greek meaning 'to shine forth, to appear, unveil itself, come out of concealment or darkness' (Boss 1963: 28). The ancient scriptures of the 'Vedas' means precisely a 'shining forth'. This comes as no surprise since ancient Greek and Sanskrit shared the same Indo-European heritage. The concern, of course, is that this too was just another form of 'tyranny'.

‘[Dasein’s] ‘bodily nature’ hides a whole problematic of its own (though we shall not treat it here)’ (Heidegger 1962: 143; Heidegger 2001: 80ff; Heidegger, 1977: 210). However, as we shall see, Heidegger displayed a wavering ambivalence when it comes to the primordially of bodily being.

First, it is important to note, however, that, despite Sartre’s and Binswanger’s expostulations, Heidegger did in fact implicitly acknowledge the importance of the human body (as a form of life) in *Being and Time*:

...biology as a “science of life” is founded upon the *ontology of Dasein*, even if not entirely. *Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being*, but essentially it is accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative Interpretation; it determines *what must be the case if there can be anything like mere-aliveness. Life is not a mere Being present-at-hand*, nor is it Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically indefinite manner) *plus* something else.

Heidegger 1962: 74-5

This passage does not seem to necessarily rule out the possibility that for Heidegger a human being is both *life and Dasein: the engaged unity* of both life as the basis for the human body and the Being that is intelligible (manifests meaning) through it (Heidegger 1962: 84-5). Indeed, Heidegger acknowledged: ‘The pervasive way of all being-open is our immediate being with things that affect us physically’ (Heidegger 2001: 73; 231-2). Furthermore, Heidegger ostensibly underscored this:

..when I am absorbed in something “body and soul”, the body is not present. Yet, this “absence” of the body is not nothing, but one of the most mysterious phenomena of privation.

Heidegger 2001: 85

Interestingly enough, Heidegger suggests this in his understanding of what phenomenology allows us to see:

...it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies *hidden*, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does

show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground.

Heidegger 1962: 59

To be sure, for Heidegger, what is hidden here is the forgetfulness of Being. Hence, Heidegger develops his Analytic of Dasein. Yet, Heidegger also points out that ‘Natura...in Greek meant “to emerge in the sense of coming from concealment to unconcealment”’ (Heidegger 2001: 158). So, our question is: ‘Why couldn’t the very same point apply to the human body (which is intrinsically natural) as hidden?’ Given, according to Heidegger’s hermeneutical realism (Dreyfus 1991), there *is a way nature is in itself* independently of Dasein’s existence (Heidegger 1962: 228, 255; 1982: 168-9; 1985: 188-9). ‘Beings are in themselves the kinds of entities they are, and in the way they are...’ (Heidegger 1984: 153, 169). Our question is why this cannot hold for the human body on the metaphysical level as Schopenhauer (1958; also see Askay 2006), for example, claimed as well? Indeed, it would seem that Schopenhauer’s analysis cogently augments Heidegger’s theory regarding nature and being (see below).

At any rate, Heidegger’s most generally consistent position does insist that (1) ‘[t]he existential analytic of Dasein comes before any psychology or anthropology, and certainly before any biology’ (Heidegger 1962: 71, 292, 238) ‘...the ontology of Dasein is *superordinate* (“has priority over”) to an ontology of life...’ (Heidegger 1962: 291); (2) we must avoid seeing the body merely as a corporeal, self-contained being (Heidegger 2001) and (3) ‘[t]he human being cannot be subdivided into parts, one that is a part of nature and the other, the more central one, that is not part of nature. For how could two such heterogeneous things be brought together and be mutually influenced by each other?’ (Heidegger 2001: 28; 1962: 74)¹² Heidegger’s ‘decisive point’ in the *Zollikon Seminars* was that the Analytic of Dasein has ontological priority over any form of bodily being (Heidegger 1962: 290; Heidegger 2001: 234, 157), and hence that embodiment is at most a derivative form of being: the body as *lifē* is a ‘bodying forth’ (Heidegger 2001: 86ff) which is outwardly directed (Heidegger 2001: 232). Bodying-forth e.g. willing, urges, etc. (Heidegger 1962: 238, 240) is *only* intelligible within the context of the Analytic of Dasein as Being-in-the-world.

¹² It is important to notice that Heidegger question begs here, why not see the two as a metaphysical unity of fundamental ontology and metontology?

Yet, even as early as *Being and Time* Heidegger asks: ‘Have we indeed exhausted all the possibilities for making Dasein accessible in its wholeness?’ (Heidegger 1962: 280). For he already acknowledged that human life is more than Dasein (Heidegger 1962). Only a brief time later, Heidegger elaborated on his hermeneutical realism: ‘nature....on its own part already is’ (Heidegger 1982: 168-9, 153, 166; 1962: 228, 255). He advocated a ‘metontology’ as a metaphysics of the primal phenomenon of human existence (Heidegger 1984: 155-8; see header quote at beginning of Article). ‘Dasein is thrown, factual, thoroughly amidst nature through it’s bodiliness...’ (1982: 166, 136-7; 1962: 51). Such a metontology makes room for a metontology of the body in its presencing, for example its sexuality (Kisiel 2007: 291). Indeed, in the therapeutic context, Heidegger emphasized that ‘silence’ and ‘hearing is a being-with-the-theme in a bodily way’, and ‘every feeling is a bodying forth tuned’ (Heidegger 1979: I, 100). In line with this, Eugen Fink tried to nudge Heidegger into seeing ‘the dark ground and forces that we share with animals’ (Heidegger 1993: 145). Heidegger’s response: ‘The bodily in the human is not something animalistic’ (ibid). This may be why Heidegger was so concerned with differentiating the animal’s being from the human’s being in the second half of his *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1929). In it, Heidegger explores the possibility of an ontology of life, thus encroaching on what he would later (1946) characterize our ‘scarcely fathomable, appalling bodily kinship with the animal’ (Heidegger 1977: 206)¹³.

Why did Heidegger so vehemently reject the claim of the ontological equi-primordiality of the body with existence? His response echoed by Boss (1979 1963) is best understood when viewed as a series of interrelated claims (for a fuller account see Askay 2006: 346-8):

1. Bodily being belongs essentially to existence.
2. Bodily being presupposes Being-in-the-world (i.e. Dasein as openness, the ecstatic dwelling in the clearing of beings). The interpretation of Dasein’s being precedes ‘every factual concretion’ (Heidegger 2001: 158, 199).

¹³ Heidegger was a bit more reserved on this latter (1952) while addressing ‘the difficult question of [the visceral commonalities shared between] “animal and man”’. (Heidegger 2001: 243-4). However, in the end Heidegger was unable to follow his own advice: ‘The phenomenon of the body is wholly unique and irreducible to something else, for instance...One must be able to accept the body in its intact being’ (Heidegger 2001: 186). Presumably, this would proscribe reducing the human body to the primordiality of Being-in-the-world as well!

3. Bodily being does not encompass all of Being-in-the-world. Bodily being is the necessary (Heidegger 2001: 88, 93, 96-7) yet insufficient condition for Dasein's being-in-the-world (Heidegger 2001).
4. Bodily being is 'founded upon' Dasein's responsiveness to the clearing (Heidegger 2001: 186, 232-3).

Therefore, Dasein's existence (Being-in-the-world) is *the* precondition for the possibility of bodily being. Bodily being was at most a derivative aspect of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Heidegger's idea was to see 'the phenomenon of the body in the context by which men are in relationship to each other' (Heidegger 2001: 96).

Hence, arguably Heidegger would no doubt have accepted Merleau-Ponty's, Sartre's, Schopenhauer's, and Freud's premises that the lived body and existence presuppose each other - and yet deny their conclusions, in that neither can be regarded as the *original* of the human being. He would point out that each presupposes the other in different ways. Bodily being is necessary for us to be related to the world in any situation. Being-in-the world is necessary for there to be any relations at all, since it is primarily an understanding of being in which anything else is possible: hence, existence is ontologically more primordial than bodily being.

This was the reason Heidegger was reticent to mention bodily being very much in *Being and Time*. To focus upon one aspect of being could have been perceived as reducing his ontological inquiry to philosophical anthropology, which is precisely what he wanted to avoid. Furthermore, to concentrate on bodily being without acknowledging its groundedness in Being-in-the-world, would have tempted one to slide back into Cartesianism (of which he accused his critics). Bodily being was a worthy focus of inquiry, but it was not something Heidegger saw as intrinsic to his project (Heidegger 2001).

Freud and human embodiment

Freud described the unconscious Id on the deepest level as the 'dark, inaccessible' 'core of our being' from which the ego evolves (Freud SE XIV: 78), and as 'a cauldron full of seething excitations', within which the organic, somatic *instincts* operate (Freud SE XXII: 73). These instinctual strivings of unconscious bodily being are the condition for the development of meaning and an awareness of what it means to be. While it is true that Freud focused upon the

biological body in his metapsychology, he nevertheless, late in his career, came to a more unified understanding of embodiment as the body-ego (Freud SE XIX). He recognized a greater metaphysical unity than his earlier acceptance of Cartesian dualism permitted. However, this conception lacked an adequate metaphysical grounding.

A critique of Heidegger on human embodiment

We are now in a position to develop a 'positive critique' - defined by Heidegger as 'to see new and real possibilities' (Heidegger 2001: 133) - of both Freud's and Heidegger's positions on human embodiment. First, Heidegger does not deny that traditional science has made some progress in understanding the laws of nature. In relation to the human body, this would encompass the disciplines of medicine, physiology, yes, even psychoanalysis. Hence, these disciplines and Being-in-the-world could be understood as involved in a mutually enlightening dialectical interplay. Together they could offer a mutually beneficial engagement and expansion of our understanding of ourselves. Furthermore, to the extent that the standard interpretation of Freud's metapsychological theory operates in accordance with the laws of nature, it could contribute enormously to that understanding. Second, Freud's theory could be reconfigured within the context of phenomenological theory to offer a greater understanding of the dialectical interplay of the anonymous given 'extantess' of nature and Being-in-the-world. Arguably this is precisely the position Merleau-Ponty held (Merleau-Ponty 1962) yet Heidegger fails to take notice of his work despite their remarkable convergence and complementariness (see below). Heidegger merely took it for granted that the human body is 'alive' and simply ignored the 'nature which runs through us'. To see the latter is the route Merleau-Ponty takes in arguing for the ontological equiprimordiality of the human body and being-in-the-world - their copresencing (Askay 2006). It was Merleau-Ponty who first recognized Heidegger's error in claiming that 'presencing itself is not a bodying forth' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 165-6; Heidegger 2001: 200). For Merleau-Ponty my body provides the thrown possibility of my presencing in the world and openness to its possibilities. Hence, the lived-body and existence are mutually implicative in their ontological primordiality. Third, more radical still would be to reinterpret Freudian psychoanalysis as grounded not only in Heidegger's being-in-the-world but in Schopenhauerian metaphysical theory. It is more than plausible that Schopenhauer's analysis of the human body as involving an altered understanding of causality, freedom, and the overcoming of the subject/object dichotomy is more than consistent with our being-in-the-world (see Askay 2006). What is most intriguing about these possibilities is that each does not mutually exclude any of the others in our pursuit of

a greater understanding of the emergence of meaning into the universe. Instead, if anything, they would seem to augment (in the mode of complementariness rather than opposition) one another. In line with Heidegger's hermeneutical each involve a 'correct' understanding of aspects of reality, without the pretense of claiming a final all-encompassing view of the meaning of the universe. This would be simply to develop a more complete, albeit constantly evolving picture of who we take ourselves to be.

Given all of the above, it is arguably Merleau-Ponty who presents a position that incorporates both Freud's and Heidegger's position. The French (see Askay 2006) (and by implication Schopenhauer, Freud, etc.), according to Heidegger/Boss, had failed to see the problem of the body in an ontologically primordial way (Heidegger 2001) since, the French lacked an adequate word for 'bodily being' 'it is very difficult to see the real problem of the phenomenology of the body' (Heidegger 2001: 157, 231; Askay 2006: 347). They misinterpret it as something 'interior' (Heidegger 2001: 91). However, Heidegger made the reverse mistake by seeing bodying forth as primarily outwardly directed (Heidegger 2001). He focused on the 'outside' relatedness to nature and other Daseins (Heidegger 2001: 158, 91). It is interesting to note that Heidegger himself viewed his own position as unacceptable (Heidegger 2001). 'The pervasive way of all being-open is our immediate being with things physically' (Heidegger 2001: 73). Furthermore, the French misinterpret being-in-the-world 'as being present-at-hand or as the intentionality of subjective consciousness...' (Heidegger 2001: 272). Merleau-Ponty conceded this point to Heidegger¹⁴.

What has happened here is that we may have several disparate yet complementary elements in a unity that give us a more encompassing theory of human existence than either by themselves. Heidegger's minimal hermeneutical realism allows for the possibility of the development of an evolving conceptual framework which in the end suggests that we can never have a 'theory of everything' precisely because of human finitude in relation to the multiplicity of different perspectives and attunement to unlimited, different dimensions. Heidegger wrote: 'our world disclosure is but the side facing us of an openness which surrounds us; an openness which is filled with many views' (Heidegger 2000: 71).

¹⁴ Indeed, Merleau-Ponty himself eventually conceded Heidegger's point: 'The problems that remain after this first description [of the *Phenomenology of Perception*]: they are due to the fact that in part I retained the philosophy of "consciousness"' (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 183, 165-7, 179).

Hence, it is clear that the body is one key to the necessary condition for both a more holistic account of human being and the emergence of meaning in the first place. This is one primary way that Heidegger's and Freud's accounts complement one another. While Heidegger focuses on how the body *engages its natural environment*, Freud (and Schopenhauer) focuses on what emerges *through* the body itself - one of the clearest accounts of our bodily being at it manifest itself through our sexuality, instincts, and unconscious processes (see Askay 2006). Such an analysis serves to explicate Heidegger's own metontology described above.

Heidegger's 'minimal hermeneutical realism' (Dreyfus 1991: 255), with its claim that the clearing as openness is more encompassing than Dasein means that Dasein stands out into the clearing. It is the intelligibility of Being, and thus, Dasein's being as disclosedness makes it possible for anything to presence itself (Heidegger 1969), to show up for us. Hence, the intelligibility of being (i.e. the analytic of Dasein) is primordial. However, Heidegger acknowledged that there might be other generative grounds for being (for which he leaves room). For example, Heidegger clearly held that nature *is*, as it is metaphysically independent of us (Heidegger 1962: 100; 1977; 1982; 1984; 2001). As such he claimed that Dasein engages a nature that surrounds it: 'the nature which "stirs and strives". which assails us and enthalls us as landscape' (Heidegger 1962; 1977). Since nature manifests itself through our own thrown bodily being and our attunement occurs through it, this opens room for the unconscious on the bodily level, and thus consistent with Schopenhauer's and Freud's positions. Bohme states this point most lucidly: 'The body...represents the largely inaccessible *nature* that we ourselves necessarily are' (Bohme 2003: 101).

Indeed, to see how closely the metaphysical positions of Schopenhauer and Heidegger converge without their merger (i.e. are complementary) consider Heidegger's description: 'Willing belongs to freedom, to being-free for a claim to which I respond. Then claim is the motive for willing. I only will [something] when I am engaged in a motive, which I appropriate it as such, when I accept it' (Heidegger 2001: 219). Schopenhauer also held that Will, as manifested through the human body, as cognition simply 'stirs' the will. It is only once the strongest motive is determined that it acts on the will which results in an act of will (Schopenhauer 1966: I, 298; 1999: 28-30, 5). These two positions can be most fruitfully understood as actively engaged in a dialectical interplay with one another (see Askay 2006).

Yet Heidegger is well known for his uniform rejection of Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory as just another version of 'thing ontology.' For example, he utterly rejects the Schopenhauerian thinking of being as will as mere immersion in misguided traditional metaphysical (Cartesian and Kantian) thinking (Heidegger 1979). However, it is Schopenhauer's theory of the body (and its overcoming of the subject/object dichotomy), causality and freedom, etc. that mirrors Heidegger's analysis in many places. At the same time, it offers a cogent analysis for the unity of nature and being (as meaning).

Furthermore, Heidegger held that there are a multiplicity of ways to understand nature, and that different theories can disclose different aspects of nature on different levels (Heidegger 1977; 2000). For instance, while discussing the Being of beings as Will, Heidegger asserted 'all great thinkers think the same. Yet this "same" is so essential and so rich that no single thinker exhausts it' (Heidegger 1979: I 36). Thus, since, for Heidegger, no one way of disclosing 'reality' is correct, accepting fundamental ontology does not a priori commit us to rejecting others such as Freud's metapsychology (as one of the 'scientific' ways of understanding nature). The rub occurs in Heidegger's recalcitrant insistence that humans do not share animalistic characteristics as part of nature. By doing so, Heidegger felt forced to renounce a holistic account and found himself entrapped in a metaphysical dualism which his philosophy had sought to obviate.

What was the role of Binswanger and Boss in all of the above? Each found themselves feeling trapped between the initial primary positions on human embodiment of these intellectual giants, and each expressed their loyalty to both. On the one hand, each held that embodiment is intrinsic to Heidegger's being-in-the-world as thrown, factual attunement – 'bodying forth...is a mode of Dasein's being' (Binswanger 1963: 159f; Boss 1979: 100-4). Yet, on the other, neither could entirely give up Freud's understanding of humans as being grounded in biological nature (Binswanger 1963)¹⁵. Yet, each reacted to this predicament in different ways.

Binswanger's path was to retain the importance of Freud's analysis of the human being in its bodily nature as an organism, while simultaneously recognizing that the body and Dasein are indissolubly interrelated - the two share an equip-primordial presencing as 'existence-in-the-

¹⁵ Although Boss may be said to have come closer to doing so than Binswanger!

body' (Binswanger 1933: 75-6; 1942-55: I, 136ff, 221; II, 104; 1957: 9; Binswanger 1963: xiv, 3, 159-61, 171n., 177, 204, 212, 216, 219; May 1958: 277, 193-6) Binswanger's form of Daseinanalysis conceived of the unconscious as intrinsic to hidden givenness as the 'transcendental horizon' (Binswanger 1963: 99) of the body¹⁶

Boss' approach for the most part was to adopt entirely Heidegger's position of the ontological superordination of Being-in-the-world over bodily being (Boss 1963; 1979). Following Heidegger, Boss agreed that the body was 'one of the media through which the world-disclosing relationships which constitute existence are carried out' (Boss 1963: 140), and that no configuring of physical forces will ever account of the development of meaning-disclosing relationships (Boss 1963). In alignment with this thesis, Boss devoted an entire chapter to 'Modes of Illness showing evident impairment of the bodying forth of human existence' (Boss 1979). It is Boss' Daseinanalysis that shows not only how the afflicted bodily sphere is disturbed, but also what way of relating is disturbed (Boss 1979), e.g. concealment can occur on the bodily level when various world-relations get closed-off (Boss 1963) or 'bodily-jamming' occurs. Following Heidegger, Boss (1963; 1979; 2000) recognizes the importance of understanding the physical processes of the brain as one major aspect of 'bodying forth.' Furthermore, both argued that modes of illnesses show impairment of the bodily sphere of human existence and hence it is important to pay attention to the bodily being. The: '[brain processes] serve merely as conditions for the emergence of phenomenon' (Heidegger 2001: 202).

However, Boss also mirrors Heidegger's ambivalence involving the bodily sphere outlined above. For example, Boss (1963: 144) recognized the importance for human beings of 'the dark, mute spheres of existence...in the somatic realm' as an important condition for the emergence of meaning. Dasein needs to be understood as 'including the body as organically connected to a material nature that we share with other beings' (Boss 1963: 140).

It is interesting to note that even though both of their approaches take steps in the direction of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological approach they rebuff it. Binswanger rejected it because he 'stops with describing phenomena and their relationships without being interested in the

¹⁶ Though he was clearly quite familiar with Schopenhauer's philosophy, Binswanger believed his notion of a 'will behind the conscious...is, of course, no use to us at all' (Binswanger 2003: 234).

fundamental ontological structure of existence' (Binswanger 1959: 163). Boss credited Merleau-Ponty (among others) for 'pointing insistently to the necessity for reconsidering the human body'. However, he criticized them for only advancing a 'half-step' beyond the natural scientific concept of the body, due to their inability to escape their Cartesian heritage (Boss 1979: 127-31). In addition, he criticized Merleau-Ponty's claim that 'man...is his body' (Boss 1963: 141). Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the legitimacy of this last criticism (see above). Furthermore, it is important to note that both Binswanger and Boss (1979) reject any possible contributions Schopenhauer has made along these lines. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty does not even mention him. Yet, given Merleau-Ponty's willingness to resituate Freud's theory within a phenomenological perspective, why not do the same with Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory?

What do Heidegger and Freud have to offer one another?

Heidegger offers a unified (though, he emphasizes, inherently incomplete) account of the human sphere of meaning and its hidden ontological dimension, while Freud (and Schopenhauer) offers an account of those hidden conditions through our bodily being that both serve as conditions for and are presupposed by that very sphere of meaning. Taken together they symbiotically show how the other's position is not only possible, but holistically more encompassing than their originators had envisioned.

Based on the above, they also have a great deal to offer one another on different levels. Space here only permits us to highlight a couple of potentially highly significant directions. Freud offers the opportunity of looking at the psychoanalytical underpinnings/origins of a thinker's ideas - he calls this 'psychobiography'. For example, what are the origins and nature of a thinker's motives in generating a worldview (Freud SE XI: 212; XIII: 179). Freud never did engage in a complete psychoanalysis of a particular philosopher's worldview. The closest he came was a cursory analysis he made on the life of Friedrich Nietzsche (Freud SE VI: 258-9; Nunberg 1962: 2, 31-2; 4, 133-4; Jones 1953: 3, 459-60)¹⁷.

¹⁷ It is no coincidence, that, historically, Nietzsche came closest to recommending a 'psychobiographical' model himself (see Nietzsche 1966: 11, 32; 1968: 251). This is an especially important point given Nietzsche's influence upon both Freud (Askay 2006) and the Heidegger four volume study of Nietzsche (1979).

Concrete examples include: (1) There may be more to Heidegger's visceral rejection of Freudian metapsychology than first meets the eye. That is, Heidegger was quite possibly using his philosophy to conceal (especially from himself) a deeper psychological motive (e.g. guilt) for rejecting Freud's theory (see Askay 2011: 133-137). For a cogent 'post-Cartesian psychoanalytical' psychobiographical account see Stolorow 2011: 87-98). And (2) a 'Freudian' psychobiographic analysis of Sartre's protracted reaction to and dismissal of Freudian theory arguably involves a very deep struggle with his own self-avowed 'underlying, unresolved neurotic [Oedipal] Complex' (see Sartre 1964a: 102, 11, 34n; 1964b: 133; see Askay 2006: 353-5 for a fuller account).

In a parallel fashion Heidegger offers us a clearer way to identify and investigate the philosophical/ontological presuppositions of a thinker's theory - what might be called his 'ontobiography'. For example, Heidegger's methodological approach is able to persuasively identify, situate historically (as Cartesian and Kantian), and explore the most fundamental philosophical presuppositions of Freud's metapsychology (see Askay 2006: 316-28 for a fuller account): (1) Only objective 'beings or "things" exist' (Freud SE XVIII: 179; XXII: 159). (2) Two forms of objective reality exist - the psychical and material (Freud 1975: 136; SE I: 103-13; SE XX: 247). (3) The subject/object dichotomy is intrinsic to our mental operations (Freud SE XIV: 134). (4) Material reality consists of the independently existing external world of things (Freud SE XIV: 368; XVII: 248). (5) Psychical reality - the mind - as a self-contained object, consists of internal mechanistic processes (Freud SE I: 295; SE VI: 536-7; SE XXIII: 163). (6) Psychical reality abductively includes unconsciousness (Freud SE XIV: 166-204; SE XII: 260-6). (7) Psychical reality is powered by an energy analogous to, and reciprocally transformable with, material - psychical (i.e. 'instinctual) energy (Freud SE I: 295; SE VII: 168; SE XIV: 85-6, 119-22; SE XXIII: 163). (8) Psychical energy is ultimately derivable from bodily - organic (mechanistic) processes (Freud SE XXII: 67; SE XXIII: 151, 156, 158). (9) Mind and body are connected via the instincts (Eros/Thanatos) (Freud SE XXII: 96; SE XXIII: 148; SE XIV: 121-2). (10) Cathexes via the psychical reservoir, continuously modify internal and external reality; the ego knows a 'phenomenal' world (Freud SE XIV: 171; SE V: 615-6). (11) The real natures of the independently existing world and the underlying psychical processes are ultimately unknowable (Freud SE I: 252; SE V: 577-8; SE VI: 229; SE XXIII: 196). (12) Space and time are 'forms of thought' (Freud SE VI: 275; SE XIV: 171, 187-8; SE XVIII: 28; SE XIX: 231; SE XXII: 74, 76). (13) Humans are causally determined (Freud SE XVII: 236; SE VI: Ch. XXII; SE V: 514; SE VI: 89-90, 239-241; SE XI: 29, 38, 52; SE XIV: 131; SE XV: 106-9, 144; SE XVIII: 238; SE XV: 254; SE XVIII: 36-7, 74, 143; SE XIX: 35-6, 48; SE XX: 93, 129-30, 151;

SE XXII: 66; SE XXIII: 145-6, 167). From these fundamental presuppositions Heidegger derived other major criticisms of Freud's metapsychology (see above and Askay 2006).

Contemporary developments in research on the relationship between Heidegger's philosophy and psychoanalysis

Ricoeur once observed: 'no reflective philosophy has come as close to the Freudian unconscious as the phenomenology of Husserl...and Merleau-Ponty' (Ricoeur 1970: 376). There is substantial evidence for this contention (Askay 2006). Yet, given this, ironically it was Heidegger, who was the most antipathetic toward psychoanalysis among these thinkers (Askay 2008), and yet exerted the greatest impact on contemporary psychoanalytic movements around the world (Askay 2011). His ontological analysis disclosed how positions such as Freud psychoanalysis are possible in the first place, and provided an ontological grounding of the body (Askay 1999; Askay 2006; Heidegger 2001; Boss 1979). The enormous interest in the influence of Heidegger's philosophy on Freudian psychoanalysis is reflected in the fact that Heidegger's *Zollikon Seminars* (in which Heidegger discusses Freud's theory extensively for the first and only time) have been translated throughout the world - from German into English, French, Italian, Japanese (Hoeller 2008). In fact, both have highly influential throughout Latin-American countries as well.

The impact of Heidegger's phenomenology on contemporary psychoanalysis around the world (for a fuller account, see Askay 2012) has centered primarily on the themes of intersubjectivity, embodiment, and language. In Germany, Holzhey-Kunz has published a recent book entitled *Daseinanalysis* (2014) in which she extends and transcends the insights of Binswanger and Boss on the mutual influence of Heidegger and Freud on these themes and others. Specifically, she tries to show why 'the therapeutic procedure of Daseinanalysis should adhere to Freud's technical fundamental rules and therefore to psychoanalysis' (Holzhey-Kunz 2014: 2). In France, it was Lacan, in his role as a psychoanalyst, who viewed Heidegger's analysis of language as foundational for our being (Lacan 1977). In Britain, Laing was heavily influenced by Heidegger in his elaboration of the divided nature of human experience and the reciprocity in analytic interaction (1965, 1969) especially as this involved the problem of intersubjectivity vs. authentic individuality (1969). In the United States/Canada there have been several pockets of continued research. First, from the psychoanalytic side, Straus was heavily influenced by Heidegger's descriptions of modes of Being-in-the-world (1966, 1969). Next, Loewald (1960) was heavily influenced by Heidegger and used it to exert a wide impact on psychoanalysis (Frie, 2003). From the 1980's on, Chessick wrote

extensively on the mutual interrelationship of Heidegger (among others) and Freudian psychoanalysis (Chessick 2005). He made an impassioned plea for a return to classical Freudian psychoanalysis, arguing that psychoanalysis was ‘losing its identity and its anchor in the works of Freud’ (Chessick 2005: xii). Finally, the psychoanalysts, influenced strongly by Heidegger, Stolorow (2004, 167), Orange and Atwood have introduced and developed a revised form of psychoanalysis called ‘intersubjectivity theory’ (Orange et al. 1997), ‘phenomenological contextualism’ (Askay and Farquhar 2011b: 2) into psychoanalytic discourse¹⁸.

From the philosophical side there are some additional philosophers (who are trained psychoanalysts as well) who have carefully investigated the mutual import of Heidegger’s philosophy and Freudian psychoanalysis. They include Richardson (widely acknowledged as the patriarch in this field in the USA) whose latest work focuses on the role of the unconscious and language in Heidegger and Lacan. He argued that their conceptions of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘intersubjectivity’ can be understood as complementing one another in a mutually, beneficial way (Richardson 2008: 60). Frie, a historian of the philosophical relationship between the two (among many others) (Frie 1997; 2003; 2006; 2008), Craig (1988; 2008) on Heidegger and Daseinanalysis, and Hoeller (2008) on the mutual relationship of the two, especially in the Heidegger-Boss relationship. Finally, there are comparative analyses being conducted on pivotal concepts shared by Freud and Heidegger. For example, see the recent work entitled *On Being Uncanny* by Katherine Withy (2015). Withy explores the relationship and engagement of Freud’s and Heidegger’s ideas of not being-at-home (*unheimlich*) in the world. In light of the above, it is clear that an intellectual and practical interest in the mutual relationship between Heidegger and Freud continues to be alive and well throughout the world.

¹⁸ The members of this group, all trained in psychoanalysis and phenomenology, are recognized as among the leading and most influential psychoanalysts in the U.S. (Cooper 2006). They fashioned a ‘psychoanalytic phenomenology’ that ‘entailed a set of interpretive principles for investigating the nature, origins, purposes, and transformation of the configurations of self and other’ and sought an ‘understanding of the phenomena transpiring in the specific intersubjective dialogue of the psychoanalytic situations’ (Atwood and Stolorow 1984: 31), and in place of the Freudian unconscious [and its instinctual underpinnings] envisioned ‘an organized totality of lived personal experience, more or less conscious’ (Stolorow, Atwood, Orange 2002: xii-xiii, 39-66). Indeed, in light of the above discussion on embodiment, it is especially noteworthy that Orange suggests that the ‘spirit of this psychoanalytic phenomenology is a position that *Merleau-Ponty* would have found close to his own intersubjectivity’ (Orange 2010: 75). Currently, Stolorow’s (also a trained philosopher) most recent work (2007; 2009; 2011) focused on Heidegger’s phenomenology and its mutually enriching implications for the psychoanalytic understanding of trauma in human existence and on showing how Heidegger’s philosophy and post-Cartesian psychoanalysis mutually enrich one another.

In conclusion, the primary intention of this article has been to show that the engagement of Freudian psychoanalysis with Heideggerian phenomenological ontology, instead of being regarded as intrinsically dialectical opposites (e.g. nature *vs.* being) as they have been traditionally regarded, are more fruitfully seen as complementarily reinforcing in the endeavor to develop a more unified and encompassing theory of human beings and to show how to engage in psychotherapy in a more critically reflective and beneficial fashion.

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