

The Disorderly Motion in the *Timaios* by Gregory Vlastos (1939). *Classical Quarterly* 33 (02): 71-83.

Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy by John F. Callahan (1948). Harvard University Press. \$US 23.03. ISBN 10: 0674731085 / ISBN 13: 9780674731080.

Basil of Caesarea a New Source for St. Augustine's Theory of Time by John F. Callahan (1958). *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* Vol. 63: 437-54.

Gregory of Nyssa and the psychological view of time by John F. Callahan (1960). *Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia* 11: 59-66.

Origen and the Stoic View of Time Panayiotis Tzamalikos (1991). *Journal of the History of Ideas* 52 (4): 535-61.

Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time by Panayiotis Tzamalikos (2006). (Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae*. Formerly *Philosophia Patrum*. Texts and Studies in Early Christian Life and Language, 77). Leiden-Boston: Brill. Pp. xiii+418. €147. ISBN 10 90 04 14728 4; ISBN 13 0920 623X.

St. Augustine on Time, Time Numbers, and Enduring Objects by Jason W. Carter (2011). *Vivarium* 49 (4): 301-23.

The Now and the Relation between Motion and Time in Aristotle: A Systematic Reconstruction by Mark Sentesy (2018). *Apeiron* 51 (3): 279-323.

There are a vast number of studies of time in ancient philosophy and Late Antiquity. The eight briefly surveyed here are selected as they focus on some of the most significant aspects of that subject which occupy many other works. In his 1939 paper, Professor Vlastos, author of several works on Plato and Socrates, argued that while scholars generally interpret the disorderly motion of *Tm* 30a, 52d–53b, and 69b as a mythical symbol, the basis for such a position is somewhat weak. Given that the *Timaeus*, the central theme of which is the myth of the creation of the universe, is one of Plato's most significant writings, this is no

small claim. His argument revolves around an examination of four points. Firstly, that the *Timaeus* is a myth; secondly the testimony of the academy; thirdly, the idea that motion could not antecede the creation of time; and fourthly that motion could not be an antecedent of the creation of soul. More recently, in a particularly dense article, Mark Sentesy argues that ‘Aristotle’s account of time contains a strong claim about the relationship between time and motion, namely that the now is instrumental in generating the temporal number through abstraction’ (p.30), and that just as numbers are generated by the soul, time is not presupposed by motion but emerges through the soul’s articulation of motion. Thus time is understood as co-constituted by the soul and motion. Sentesy reconstructs the relationship between the now (*to nun*), motion, and number in Aristotle to clarify the nature of the now, and, thereby, the relationship between motion and time (*Phys.* IV.11 219b1). Although it is clear that for Aristotle motion, and, more generally, change, are prior to time, the nature of this priority is not clear. But if time is the number of motion, then the priority of motion can be grasped by examining his theory of number. Sentesy then considers the now in relation to both motion and soul, and thus to the being of time. For Aristotle, the now is part of the soul’s articulation of motion, and sets the stage for an act that distinguishes a unit from its underlying motion. The now, then, sets up an abstraction by which the soul generates the temporal number from motion. Reconstructing this account of abstraction, he argues, allows us to formulate more strongly Aristotle’s claim to the ontological dependence of time on motion. The paper then gives a systematic overview of the relationships between the now and number in order to address the question of whether the now might be extended. It closes with an examination of the possibility that motion depends on time, and how universal time is possible. He concludes that ‘for Aristotle, time is an epiphenomenon of motion, and ontologically dependent upon it’ (p.31). By insisting that time is necessarily tied to change and measurement, Aristotle arguably shows himself more cautious than Plato.

John Callahan’s 1948 study, which he quite rightly calls one of the most important problems in philosophy, brings together summaries of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and Augustine as the four most important representatives of ancient views of time. He characterises the view of time in each, respectively, as ‘the moving image of eternity’; ‘number and motion’; ‘the life of the

soul'; and as 'a distention of man's soul'. These are, Professor Callahan insists, diverse points of view on something that each of these four ancient writers conceives very variously. In other words, because they understand the problem of time differently, they approach it not as the same thing from different angles but quite discretely. This is a view not entirely dissimilar to that of Tzamalikos in his assessment of the Stoic notion of time. In a more recent study Jason Carter discusses how throughout his works, Augustine suggested a number of distinct views on the nature of time, at least three of which have remained almost unnoticed in the secondary literature. He examines each these, nine in all, and attempts to diffuse common misinterpretations, especially of the view which seeks to identify Augustinian time as an un-extended point or a *distentio animi*. Second, he argues that Augustine's primary understanding of time, like that of later medieval scholastics, is that of an accident connected to the changes of created substances. Finally, he suggests how this interpretation has the benefit of rendering intelligible Augustine's contention that, at the resurrection, motion will still be able to occur, but not time. Augustine is also Callahan's starting point in his 1958 article. Here he argues that particularly in the twenty-third chapter in the eleventh book of the *Confessions*, we can see for the first time, a move from a physical to a psychological understanding of time as an extension in the mind – an idea later taken up by Leibniz - albeit it foreshadowed in Plotinus' reading of the *Timaeus*. For Plotinus 'as for Augustine time is a kind of distention; he uses the expression *diastasis zōēs*, but it is a distension of the life of the soul only insofar as it produces motion, whether this be on a cosmic scale or in the life of the individual man' (p.438). But for his definition of time, in terms of a change in which movement is not essential, Callahan considers that Augustine relied not on Plato but on Basil's *Adversus Eunomium* I.21. There is some uncertainty about whether Augustine actually knew this work, though it is generally accepted that he was familiar with a Latin version of the *Hexaemeron*. Later, in a paper published in 1960, Professor Callahan argued that a further influence on Augustine's view of time came from Gregory of Nyssa particular his idea that time consists of three states of mind.

The earlier of the two studies by Professor Tzamalikos' shows convincingly that in relation to Origen's theory of time, the starting point was the Stoicism which considered time as a kind of extension (*diastēma*) of motion. The entire first half of this paper

is devoted to a careful presentation of the Stoic position that, in this reviewer's opinion, is far clearer than those found elsewhere. Later, in an erudite and masterly exposition Tzamalikos makes a valiant attempt to rescue Origen from what M.J. Edwards in the *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* (Vol. 58 (1): 109-10) has called 'the tragic misunderstandings which arise sometimes from too credulous a use of Latin renderings from lost archetypes, and sometimes from the obtrusion of other men's libels into printed editions of the *De principiis*'. Tzamalikos concludes that far from being an exposition of Neoplatonic philosophy, Origen elaborates a cosmology and ontology of time based on a synthesis of Jewish, Hellenistic and Christian ideas.

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