FEAR OF STRANGERS; WHOSE HOME IS IT

Roger Kennedy

'Modern living means living with strangers, and living with strangers is at all times a precarious, unnerving and testing life' (Bauman 1993: 161).

Introduction

The sense of home as the ground of our being, the place we need in order to feel secure, is fundamental. Yet we often feel to a greater or lesser extent incomplete, divided, and lacking a sense of the whole. There is a yearning for wholeness, for a home where we can feel truly ourselves, but this can also cause us considerable unhappiness. Some carry a firm sense of home within; others need something external, yet others need a being that transcends daily life such as a God in order to feel complete. Whatever the nature of the home we seek, the fear of homelessness is never far from that of the sense of being at home. I will argue that a fear of a loss of home, or more fundamentally a fear of a loss of a psychic structure which provides a central core of our identity – a 'psychic home' (Kennedy 2014) – accounts for a certain amount of prejudiced and intolerant attitudes to refugees and migrants; that basic fears about being displaced by so-called 'strangers' from our precious and precarious sense of a psychic home can tear communities apart, as well as lead to discrimination against those who appear to be different. I shall look at issues of tolerance and intolerance, as well as the role of the stranger and strangeness in provoking basic fears about our identity, in the hope that psychoanalytic thinking can add a dimension to our understanding of current anxieties concerning the current movement of peoples into Europe, many of whom are perceived by local inhabitants as 'strange' and that such psychoanalytically based thinking can lead to increased toleration of differences. However, it is of course not an easy process for the stranger to become reasonably enough integrated into a new community, and I shall propose that a 'tolerance process' is required, involving a number of steps, some of course practical but others more crucially involving psychological shifts from both the newcomers and 'oldcomers'. I can only sketch the beginnings of this notion in this paper, and to do so will require looking at some philosophical

and sociological thinking, where some of these issues have already begun to be considered, with the intention of deepening the psychoanalytic contribution to this complex social problem.

Home and homelessness

If one is to understand the place of homelessness in the human psyche or soul, then Freud's paper on *The Uncanny – das Unheimliche*, the 'unhomely' – is fundamental. Uncanny experiences include those that are frightening and arouse a sense of horror and dread. Freud traces such experiences back to what is previously known and familiar, and yet which erupt in unexpected ways. The word *das Heimliche* in German can be traced back to what is homelike, what belongs to the house, but also something that becomes concealed, withdrawn from the eyes of strangers, (Freud 1919: 225). Typical uncanny experiences include inanimate objects apparently coming to life, a sudden appearance of a double, the appearance of ghosts and spirits and other hauntings. Something becomes uncanny when the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, (ibid.: 244). Ultimately, the uncanny is something which is secretly familiar and has undergone repression and then returned from it (ibid.: 245) – hence the double feeling of the strange and the unfamiliar that is indicative of an uncanny experience.

There is an uneasy tension in the modern soul between feeling at home and feeling estranged. This tension is revealed in uncanny experiences, which one might say remind us on the precariousness of our hard won sense of psychic organization. Michel de M'Uzan (2009) emphasizes how uncanny experiences commemorate a crucial phase in the development of psychic functioning, a moment which brings to the fore the indeterminate nature of identity, when the self becomes 'strange' to itself.

The latter point resonates with Julia Kristeva's meditation on the stranger – 'Strangers to Ourselves' (Kristeva 1991). She writes that with Freud, an uncanny foreignness creeps into the tranquility of reason. 'Henceforth, we know that we are foreigners to ourselves, and it is with the help of that sole support that we can attempt to live with others' (Kristeva 1991: 170). That is, we are our own foreigners, strangers to ourselves, divided and estranged. Psychoanalysis is a 'journey into the strangeness of the other and of oneself, towards an ethics of respect for the irreconcilable. How could one tolerate a foreigner if one did not know one was a stranger to oneself?' (ibid.: 182). One could indeed say that in order to listen psychoanalytically at all requires one to abandon the familiar so as to be receptive to the strange and unfamiliar.

Yet it is only with the greatest of efforts at times that we can learn to tolerate both the strange within and the stranger without.

Otto Fenichel's 1940 paper on Anti-Semitism resonates with Kristeva's thought, and remains relevant for understanding contemporary intolerance to strangers, such as minorities within communities or migrants and refugees from other cultures. Of course Fenichel had in mostly in mind East European Jews in Czarist Russia or the Jews in the Middle Ages, while he was battling to understand the prejudice against Jews in a Germany where they were much more integrated. Yet his notions still have a contemporary resonance in trying to look at issues of projection and displacement, as well as paying attention to how psychoanalysis and social theory can enrich one another.

For Fenichel, the anti-Semite arrives at his hatred of the Jews by a process of displacement or projection, seeing the Jew as everything that brings him misery, not only from his external oppressor but also misery from his internal world, his unconscious instincts (Fenichel 1940: 37). The Jew, as with other persecuted groups, can be a vehicle for such projections because of the difference in Jewish life and practices, their apparent difference in appearance, their 'foreignness' and their long history of retaining their identity. There are of course also social factors, such as their role as moneylenders at a time when usury was a sin for Christians, which perpetuated their long- standing outsider role. A racial minority such as the Jews can become suitable as a carrier of projections because 'One's own unconscious is also foreign. Foreignness is that which the Jews and one's own instincts have in common' (ibid.: 31). The foreigner can become 'uncanny', a reminder of archaic and repressed desires. Thus, 'The Jew with his unintelligible language and ununderstandable God appears uncanny to the non-Jews, not only because they cannot understand him and therefore can imagine all sorts of sins in him, but still more so because they can understand him very well somewhere in the depths, because his customs are archaic, that is contain elements which they once had themselves, but later lost' (ibid.: 31-2).

Perhaps the archaic history of the Jews, who were enslaved, gained their freedom from servitude and then found their homeland, only to be expelled from it and forced to wander into foreign homes in order to settle, has a particular resonance, stirring up primitive fears about the loss of home and a threat to identity. It may also be possible to extend Fenichel's explanations about attitudes to Jews to prejudiced attitudes towards refugees from Syria and other parts of the world, many of whom are also fleeing from a form of servitude.

Thus one can see how the myth of the stranger as different, strange, weird, uncanny, can make people feel not 'at home' with the stranger, seeing them as potential threats to identity rather than as potential allies. They bring their own ways of life, their habits and customs, or their 'habitus', to quote Bourdieu (1990: 53), that is their durable, transportable, dispositions, their feel for their own fields of cultural practice, which may or may not overlap with the fields of practice of the indigenous population. Equally those already at home in their country can forget that the history of many European countries involves waves of mass migration, going back thousands of years. This history reveals how identity is not a fixed entity, but fluid, hybrid and complex.

Of course, identity matters in immediate and indeed practical ways. For example, if you wish to renew your UK passport, you now have to apply to the 'Identity and Passport service', which will authenticate your personal details and confirm your identity as a UK citizen, or not. Having a home is vital to this. Without an address, you cannot really be a citizen. This dilemma was especially poignant after the Second World War. Tony Judt (2005) has charted in his ground-breaking book *Postwar*, how there took place then a massive movement of millions of people, due to the aftermath of the fighting and displacement of communities, the opening up of the concentration camps and also the civil wars that soon took place in what became communist Europe. Not only had there been, as a result of Stalin and Hitler, the uprooting, transplanting and deportation of some 30 million people between 1939 and 1944, but after the war Europe had to deal with an unprecedented exercise in ethnic cleansing and population transfer. Untold millions were displaced or were refugees. The distinction between displaced persons, assumed to have somewhere, a home to go to, and refugees, who were classified as homeless, was one of the many nuances that were introduced by the authorities trying to deal with this trauma, whose legacy remains to this day, marking the European identity. Yet there are places in Europe where this history has either been forgotten or just erased, so that all those wishing to enter European space are lumped together as one threatening entity.

The psychic home

In order to clarify a psychoanalytic contribution to the current political and social unrest in Europe, I suggest that it would be helpful to look how the place of a psychic home can add a dimension to the understanding of conflict between people from different geographical areas. I would suggest that having a psychic home, an internal sense of a secure home base, is a key feature of identity. The psychic home provides an organizing psychic structure for the sense of

emerging identity. Such a home base must be built up from a number of different elements, as with the physical home, which forms its substrate. There are intra-psychic elements but also inter-subjective elements, involving the social world.

1. There is the basic structure of a home as a protected and hopefully welcoming space for shelter, providing the core of the internalized psychic home. The physical space of the home has an important function in helping to shape the interior life. One may say that the psychic home has a dual aspect – as both physical and psychical container.

In this notion of a psychic home, the physical structure of the home has an important part to play in providing an overall, containing structure or psychic container, which becomes internalized as an organizing configuration.

The English word home derives from the old Norse, *Heima*, and perhaps encapsulates something of the Viking longing for home and hearth as a stable physical base to return to after their many voyages of exploration and conquest.

The physical structure of the home has an interior marked out by defining walls. The boundary between the interior and the exterior may be firm and stable or flimsy or permeable; the bricks and mortar of the family home may be loose or secure, with a clear focus or none. One may recall here the story of the three little pigs – only the house built of bricks could withstand the breath of the hungry wolf. Indeed, it was the third pig's fireplace that eventually killed off the wolf as he climbed down the chimney.

The boundaries of the house also have to be seen in context, within a community of other homes, and within a society. The home must be permeable to external influences, or else it will become the source of unreal relationships, including intolerance of strangers, who are perceived as threats to the precarious psychic home.

2. There is already a pre-established inter-subjective symbolic space predating the building or setting up of the home. The home-to-be already has a place in the family history and narrative, already situated as an element in a complicated network of relationships. There is a lineage, reaching back generations. The individual in a family is already situated before birth in a complicated, mostly unconscious, network of symbols, or kinship structure. Influenced by the work of Levi-Strauss on how unconscious social laws regulated marriage ties and kinship,

structuring them like language, Lacan called this network the 'Symbolic Order' (Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986: 89). It is the Order into which the emerging subject has to structure himself, language, for him, being the key element through which this structuring takes place. I would want to add the vital contributions to the emergence of the human subject of the rich pre-verbal world, the world in which language is beginning to take shape.

3. The contents of the psychic home, its mental furniture, consist essentially of identifications with family members making up the home's interior. In the secure home, the parents provide continuity over time in their home making, providing a supportive base for the children to eventually leave, and ultimately to build up, their own home. A stable psychic home involves individuals being recognized as being autonomous yet dependent, and receiving respect for their own individuality, with secure attachments. One can perhaps see most clearly here how the psychic home is integral to the notion of identity with the adolescent, for whom identity formation is a crucial task. They need the home base from which to explore but also, they need it to be there for their return. This is perhaps why it can be so traumatic for the adolescent when their parents split up at this crucial point in their development, supposedly as they are now 'old enough' to be able to cope.

One can also see how a sense of individual identity depends upon the mutual relationships in the family being respectful of personal autonomy; that is, boundaries within the home need to be respectful, with individuality being respected and recognized. If such boundaries are not respected, then it is likely that strangers from outside the family and community will also not be respected.

For any individual, alternative psychic homes will develop in time, particularly if their family of origin is unstable or rejecting. For those with a core sense of a psychic home, it may be less conflictual to settle in alternative homes, to feel at home in a number of different places, cultures, overlapping and interpenetrating, to be 'cosmopolitan'. For such people, the stranger can be a source of positive curiosity, not a threat to their stability.

4. The ordinary home consists of activities; it is not a static or frozen entity. What could be called the 'work of the day' (Kennedy 2007: 246-60) takes place within the home. This refers to significant events, which require thought and/or action. The ordinary work of the day, structured around everyday activities, involves attention to all the significant, and at times deceptively indifferent, thoughts, feelings and experiences that occupy us during the day and

provide the raw material for thinking and for dreaming. Much of this psychic work carries on automatically without us being particularly aware of its regular occurrence or of its everydayness. It is usually taken for granted, unless the family has major problems, of the kind where the family home has broken down, and where ordinary family life cannot be held together safely.

Thus one can see how the notion of a psychic home consists of a number of different and interacting elements, including the physical interior of a home but internalized as a psychic interior. The notion of 'personal identity', refers to the development and then maintenance of a person's character, how they put together in some way their various multiple identifications, as well as including wider issues concerning a person's cultural and social influences. I am suggesting that the basic elements of the psychic home can be seen to provide a way of organizing the person's identity or can be seen as intrinsic to any notion of identity.

The psychic home in psychoanalytic treatment

Like our patients, we psychoanalysts carry our psychic home with us, though it will manifest itself differently. We may not reveal details of our private life to our patients, but we carry our psychic home with us into the session. Our choice of interior design of the consulting room, not to mention the books and any objects, may well reflect the nature of our psychic home; there is an interaction between the subjectivity of the analyst and the interior space where they work. An alive psychic home can provide a sustaining space for the analyst, allowing them to cope with the inevitable loneliness of the work.

While the analytic work carries on in separate localities, that of analyst and that of the patient, they do intertwine in various ways, in a dynamic fashion. Sometimes the analyst may find that their psychic home is invaded by the patient, with little space to think or feel; or else there may be a confusion of spaces, with little sense of a boundaried psychic home. These experiences may occur at once or take time to develop through the strange unfolding of the transference and counter-transference. A patient comes into our consulting room for the first meeting. We may have spoken to them briefly on the telephone, or communicated by email, perhaps have found out a little about them, either directly or from a referring colleague. But the fact is, both analyst and patient are strangers to one another in a number of ways, both with regard to knowing about their lives and cultures, but also with regard to their strange inner life. We provide a potential home for the expression of this inner life, for the engagement of the analyst's and patient's psychic homes.

In psychoanalytic treatments, one can see the notion of a psychic home in a variety of ways. Just to take a brief example from my own practice:

Mrs. X now has a good home, with a stable family, but she never feels secure in herself; she carries around inside some deep anxieties, linked to the experiences of her early life. Her parents split up when she was very young, her mother soon remarried and then the patient was sent to boarding school soon after. Until the analysis, she had never questioned what had led to the break-up of the family, or why she was sent away from home. She carries around quite a fragile sense of a psychic home, afraid of expressing dependent feelings, and quite emotionally inhibited as a person.

She struggled for a long time with the analytic setting. She wanted to come to sessions, but as soon as she arrived, feelings of dread and despair would quickly arise, making, as she said, the 'couch uncomfortable'. She managed her discomfort by a sort of freezing, with her body stiff and immobile on the couch. The analytic setting for a long time thus became a necessary but dreaded place. She would often wonder why she wanted to come; when on entering the consulting room she would feel so awful.

One of the main themes was an almost complete absence of early home memories, particularly after the break-up of her parent's marriage. She could recall losing a precious soft toy, and that her mother took her to an expensive store to replace it, but no substitute was found to be suitable, though she made do with some hard toys. However, bit-by-bit over the years, some early scenes came to her mind, after we had gone over some of the difficult feelings she experienced at boarding school. There, she often felt lonely, cut off and not one of the group. She began to make connections with some of her current fears about intimacy and those boarding school experiences. One session seemed to convey something of a turning point. It was the first time that she had made a stand about coming to her analysis.

She began in a fairly animated way. She was annoyed because at work there was a new computer system, and she had been told that she would have to set aside some full days to learn it. That would mean missing both personal commitments and her analytic sessions. She was angered by her (female) manager who expected this of her. However, she was not going to go along with this and would leave early to come to her sessions. My patient was also annoyed that she herself was made to feel neglectful by not going along with her work's expectations.

I was immediately struck by her making sure she would come to her analysis despite the pressure to miss out.

She was also worrying about a vulnerable client who was angry about having their invalidity benefit being removed. She was not sure what he would do to himself. There were also worries about a close family member who was ill and still in hospital.

I said that she was telling me about a number of outside pressures that had to be overcome. She did overcome them when she had decided she would come to her analysis.

She said that in fact her manager was normally reasonable, but what annoyed my patient was that the manager herself was being put under pressure from above but that she could not stand up to it. My patient did not want to be the one who made a fuss. She feared both standing out and any retaliation – the latter was a real fear, as someone in the team had in fact been effectively excluded for making a fuss previously.

I said, 'You mean, do people make a fuss, or do they have to put up with whatever comes their way'.

This comment made her think of a member of her family who had to go into hospital recently and put up with poor treatment and incompetent staff.

(I was thinking, 'Do I put up with her or make a fuss? What kind of manager/analyst am I for her? How competent am I?')

She continued, her family members would not find out what is happening to them. Typically for her family, they just gave themselves to the doctors.

I said, 'Well, there is a doctor here, and maybe you fear giving yourself up to me'.

She agreed. She talked about it being difficult here, with issues of control and power. She has to fit in with the holiday dates I had recently given her. Though she also sees they are reasonable, given the reality of the summer holidays and her own children's school dates. But there is an imbalance of power. She cannot make me say things. She does not know when I

will say things. She wants me to say more. She has zero control over me. She added that she often had a sense of deprivation here; she felt deprived for much of the time.

After a pause, she said that she was having thoughts about mothers and babies, and all that babies get from their mothers in terms of physical contact and visual stimulation, as much as talking.

I linked what she told me about her own possible early depriving experiences as a baby or young child, with a mother who came and went, and how she could not make a fuss, she had to put up with what she was given, the hard toys for the soft ones.

She said that when I do speak she can feel in contact, and that does give her enough to keep going, but the feeling of deprivation is still often there. So, she felt better about being here, even though it was also difficult.

I acknowledged what she had told me and then finished the session.

While of course there were many different elements to the session and to what was going on in the analysis at that time, I would point to the fact that it was a new experience for her to take a stand about her sessions. This did seem to be linked to a developing, if fragile, sense of being more 'at home' in the analysis, even though that meant having to experience difficult feelings. Given the fact that home for her was so full of conflict – with a mixture of loss, displacement and rejection, I did feel this was a significant development.

The dynamics of the stranger

Those fleeing wars, such as the current wave of Syrian refugees, are of course hoping for a safe haven, a place where they can rebuild their lives. One of my main points is that it is not only that such people require practical help, but that there are some fundamental issues concerned with the nature of identity that need to be faced by both the refugee populations and the potential host countries if there is to be a hope for reasonable integration. In particular, there is a complex interaction between, as it were, the psychic homes of refugee and host. The refugee feels a stranger in a new environment, carrying within their own sense of psychic home (however ravaged by trauma) and the host may feel a fear of a loss of their secure sense of a psychic home as a result of being 'invaded' and 'enveloped' by all these strangers, 'diluting' and 'contaminating' their own culture and sense of community.

In order to understand the place of the stranger in communities, one can look at some key sociological texts, which already point the way towards some resolution of some of these basic tensions. There is substantial literature on the nature of the stranger, mainly from the last century. The stranger can be defined as a person who tries to be permanently accepted or at least tolerated by the group which he approaches (Schutz 1944: 499). For Simmel (1971: 143), the stranger is not the wanderer who comes today and leaves tomorrow, but the man who comes today and stays tomorrow; he is a potential wanderer, who has not quite got over the freedom of coming and going. In the case of the stranger, the union of closeness and remoteness involved in every human relationship is patterned in a particular way – 'the distance within the relation indicates that one who is close by is remote, but his strangeness indicates that one who is remote is near' (ibid.: 143). A trace of this strangeness, the elements of closeness and remoteness, enters into even the most intimate relationships (ibid.: 147). Because of their strange intermediate position, neither owning a home within the community nor being totally outside, the stranger can be more objective about attitudes, freer from local prejudices, and thereby, like the psychoanalyst, can be the receiver of confidences.

The stranger can thus be a potentially creative force, a catalyst for change and for challenging the 'thinking as usual' approach of the home group. Of course, the stranger may also be a significant threat to the home community and even destabilizing, and, as I have indicated, this matches current fears about being 'swamped' by those wishing to escape wars from outside Europe.

The stranger is thus imbued with a good deal of ambivalence, and may or may not be integrated into the home culture. They may remain in a transitional position, neither in nor out, but for that reason a potential force for change.

Margaret May Wood (1934) made the point that the way that a stranger may or may not be integrated into the home culture will depend upon the social relationships already within that culture. Thus factors which tend to allow integration of the stranger will include similarity of language or the stranger learning the new language, shared values, a lack of affection from the stranger to their own country of origin (though that could potentially cause more difficulty if they bring with them too many resentments), gratitude to the host community if they make available a new home, owning property and land, and intermarriage. Conversely, a stranger may fail to integrate if these sorts of elements are not present.

Bauman (1993) emphasizes that strangehood has become a permanent condition of modern life. The problem of modern society is not how to eliminate strangers, but how to live in their constant company, in a situation of constant uncertainty as to their responses. After all, to live in a modern city, at least in a democratic society, is to be faced by millions of strangers. There need to be spaces, such as cinemas, theatres and parks, 'managed playgrounds', where strangers can meet or pass by without fear of being challenged. This would contrast with totalitarian regimes that demand absolute conformity; any stranger, any strange behaviour can be seen as a challenge to absolute authority. Even in democratic societies there can be periods when intolerance of strangers becomes an acute problem; the period of McCarthyism in the US in the 1950's being one typical such period. Current Islamophobic utterances reveal that that intolerance can always find someone eager to blame strangers for the ills of the world.

Such paranoid attitudes to strangers contrasts with the reality of the necessity for close and creative contact with foreign cultures in order for societies to be enriched. One has only to think of how Picasso and Braque appropriated forms and motifs from African art, which brought to its climax a long interest which nineteenth century France had shown in the exotic, the distant and the primitive (Hughes 1991: 20).

Appiah in his book, *Cosmopolitanism, Ethics in a World of Strangers* (2006) explores the vital importance for the health of societies that they foster a notion of decent living with strangers. He defines cosmopolitanism (Appiah 2006: xiii) as involving having obligations to others, that stretch beyond those we have to our family and to our own culture; and that we take seriously the values of others who do not have our beliefs or take part in our practices. Such an attitude contrasts with the intolerant totalitarian position, which involves loyalty to only one portion of humanity, often excluding others. It is no coincidence that people in such regimes have a constant fear that their homes will be invaded. In between there are many other variations, or what Appiah calls a 'partial cosmopolitanism' (Appiah 2006: xv), that is a certain amount of openness to other cultures, with degrees of tolerance, while retaining one's own strong tendency to stick to one's own psychic home as a refuge and shelter.

Such texts then point on the one hand to the universal ambivalence towards strangers, and yet also to the need to recognize and overcome such ambivalence if societies are to grow. But one can add that for that process of growth to be achievable, there needs to be attention to the nature of tolerance and intolerance states of mind.

Intolerant states of mind

Even in democratic societies there can be periods when intolerance of strangers becomes an acute problem; the period of McCarthyism in the US in the 1950's being one typical such period. Current Islamophobic utterances reveal that that intolerance can always find someone eager to blame strangers for the ills of the world. Indeed, fear and intolerance go hand in hand.

Martha Nussbaum has tackled the role of fear in underpinning many intolerant attitudes to strangers in her book *The New Religious Intolerance* (2012). On the one hand, fear is a basic emotion which has evolutionary survival value, enabling a person to be able to react to perceived danger. Indeed the fear response is necessary for being able to perceive otherness; psychopaths seem unable to have a normal fear response and this makes them dangerous to others. However fear can be irrational and can also produce unreliable and unpredictable behaviour, which can be exploited by politicians eager to whip up aggression against minority groups. This kind of fear tends to be narcissistic, with a narrow focus around self-preservation. It may start from some real problem such as economic insecurity, but it can be easily displaced, or projected, onto something that has little to do with the underlying problems. It is also nourished by the idea of the 'disguised enemy', who may do harm (Nussbaum 2012: 23-4). Fear can also spread quickly and easily like a forest fire; fear encourages further fear; it may need considerable resources to quench the fires of hate. Thus, though fear is valuable and essential in a genuinely dangerous world (we are, for example, right to be fearful of North Korean aggression), it can be of itself one of life's great dangers (ibid.: 58).

Lifton (2003) has described how the Nazi excesses were indicative of a particular kind of 'apocalyptic violence', now visible in terrorists and even at times in the West's reactions to terrorist risks. Apocalyptic violence, whatever its origins in feelings of past humiliation or social disadvantage, involves extreme fantasies of spiritual renewal through killing. Hitler's followers, 'sought to destroy much of what they saw as a racially polluted world by means of a vast biological purification program. Despite being murderously anti-Jewish and significantly anti-Christian as well, the Nazis drew upon what was most apocalyptic in both of those traditions. The Nazis came to epitomize the apocalyptic principle of killing to heal, of destroying vast numbers of human beings as therapy for the world' (ibid.: 28-9).

The idea of apocalyptic martyrdom, now so visible in ISIS and other terrorist developments, 'intensifies the ordeal of the killer as well as his claim to spiritual renewal, while dramatizing

his death as transcending those of his victims. The martyr brings his own being – the sacrifice of his own life – into the dynamic of world destruction and recreation, thus exemplifying that death- and-rebirth process' (ibid.: 29).

Unfortunately the West, at least in the years immediately following the 9/11 slaughter, also responded with apocalyptic logic, maintaining that the forces of evil would be wiped out by the forces of democracy, cleaning the world of the extremists. In the name of destroying evil, each side sought to destroy the other. This kind of potentially very dangerous thinking continues to be visible today, for example in current relations with the North Korean dictatorship.

Christopher Bollas (1992: 193-217) describes in detail what he calls the 'fascist state of mind', visible not only in genocidal acts but potentially in all of us. Whatever the social factors that might lead to genocide, the core element in the fascist state of mind is 'the presence of an ideology that maintains its certainty through the operation of specific mental mechanisms aimed at eliminating all opposition' (ibid.: 200). In this frame of mind, doubt, uncertainty and self-inquiry are considered to be weaknesses and must be expelled.

Bollas gives a detailed picture of the dynamics of how the fascist ideology becomes so destructive, as the intolerance of uncertainty and destruction of opposition creates a moral void.

> At this point the subject must find a victim to contain that void, and now a state of mind becomes an act of violence. On the verge of its own moral vacuum, the mind splits off this dead core self and projects it into a victim henceforth identified with the moral void...As contact with the moral void is lost through projective identification into a victim, and the victim now exterminated, the profoundly destructive processes involved are further denied by a form of delusional narcissism...As the qualities of the other are destroyed via the annihilation of the other, a delusional grandiosity forms in the Fascistically stated mind.
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> Bollas 1992: 203

One can thus see in the accounts from Lifton and Bollas how apocalyptic thinking in its various guises creates extreme forms of intolerance, offering a perverse moral universe, where the

awareness of difference is destroyed. While intolerance may not reach the extremes perpetrated by the Nazi and Communist regimes, the way that intolerant states of mind can rise and be sustained in groups, particularly when encouraged by a populist leader, is similar.

One cannot of course underestimate the trauma of being on the receiving end of such persistent intolerant regimes. The Czech psychoanalyst Michael Sebek, having experienced at first hand living through the traumas of a communist regime, has written about the nature of the psychological processes involved in totalitarian regimes, emphasizing the place of what he calls the 'totalitarian object' that can come to dominate individuals in a repressive society, but may also function in post-totalitarian regimes as well as at times in more democratic societies. This is a repressive and intrusive form of psychic structure that becomes internalized in a society that demands compliance and obedience, where there is low tolerance for the difference of others, stressing unity and sameness. In addition, 'Totalitarian objects (external and internal) may also bring some safety to immature persons who like to merge with a strong authority in order to get a feeling of importance and wholeness. The idealization of totalitarian objects may be an important device for saving objects from destruction and using the process of splitting to attain some psychic balance' (Sebek 1996: 290).

There is always a risk that the totalitarian object may take over the individual and the group's functioning creating intolerance towards anything outside the narrow functioning prescribed as acceptable. This is visible not only in a totalitarian society but also in pockets of other forms of society, such as with radicalized youth, or any extreme political organization that demands compliance, obedience coupled with an identification with charismatic leadership.

The tolerance/intolerance dynamic and the tolerance process

Tolerance is a complex phenomenon, and there is a massive literature on what one could call the tolerance/intolerance dynamic, most of it focusing on social, political, and legal issues, and few looking at psychological tolerance. Much of this literature still owes a considerable debt to the classical writings on mainly religious tolerance by, for example, Locke, Bayle, Spinoza and Bodin, as well as Mill's essay on liberty which puts forward the notion of the harm principle – individual liberty must be tolerated unless this conflicts with a potential (and significant) harm to the community. In general, it is proposed that tolerance entails putting up with a person, activity, idea or organization of which or whom one does not really approve, at least initially (King 1976: 21). Or it can be seen as an attitude or practice, which is only called for in certain social conflicts. As Rainer Forst (2012) puts it: toleration involves conflict:

> The distinctive feature is that tolerance does not resolve, but merely contains and defuses, the dispute in which it is invoked; the clash of convictions, interests or practices remains, though certain considerations mean that it loses its destructiveness...The promise of toleration is that coexistence in disagreement is possible.
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> Forst 2012: 1

Of course this leads to a number of questions such as what kind of conflicts call for or permit tolerance, who are the subjects and what are the objects of tolerance, what kinds of reasons are there for objecting or accepting what is to be tolerated and what are the limits of toleration in different cases, including how far can the intolerant be tolerated? One can also ask what kind of tolerance is specific to psychoanalysis? It would certainly seem that a psychoanalytic approach to this vast field would indeed involve 'tolerance in conflict', or more specifically tolerance of conflict and of uncertainty. A psychoanalytic attitude would be conducive to toleration of conflicting viewpoints, at least in theory. Unfortunately, in practice, we know only too well that psychoanalytical institutions are awash with intolerance. For that reason alone, it would undoubtedly be worthwhile for psychoanalysts to pay close attention to the tolerance/intolerance dynamic both in themselves and in their institutions. The point is that, as I have mentioned, this is a dynamic; one needs to provide a framework and a willing atmosphere in which conflicts of these kinds can be examined, with no necessary perfect resolution. The resolution in a sense is in the processing of the dynamic. It is hard work.

In order to provide some guide to the vast landscape of tolerance studies, I would suggest that one could summarize the different ways of conceptualizing tolerance as follows. It is worth noting that these categories are not rigid and that they usually involve interplay between different positions, and that in a given situation there is usually a mixture of tolerance and intolerance:

1. One can divide the field into Subject and Object Tolerance. By Subject Tolerance, I mean that one respects the other and others as subjects of their experience, with agency and capacity for independent judgment. This contrasts with Object Tolerance, when the other and others are seen as mere objects to be treated as subject to those in power. Those that are merely tolerated as objects may be confined in a ghetto or walled off from society in less visible ways, but their object status remains. The degree to which others are treated as subjects will of course vary,

providing a complex interplay between subject and object tolerance. In a clinical setting, one could imagine a patient moving from a position of object tolerance to subject tolerance as their capacity to become a subject develops (Kennedy 2007: 180ff).

2. One can divide the field, as does Forst, into the Permission or Respect conception of tolerance. The Permission conception is about those in power allowing others, usually a minority, to live in accordance with their own convictions. This would be to accept a minority's minimal demands for freedom of belief and practice, but may be better than nothing, at least for a while. It is a kind of 'vertical' tolerance, from top down. With Respect Tolerance, the tolerating parties respect one another as autonomous persons, as equally entitled members of a community under the rule of law. Clearly this is similar to Subject Tolerance and is more like a 'horizontal' form of tolerance, involving more equal relationships.

3. There is Negative Tolerance*,* in which one just puts up with a person or persons, while Positive Tolerance involves a willingness to actively engage with and actively accept the other. This is similar to a position of putting up with the other for pragmatic reasons, such as it not being worthwhile to challenge different ideas, beliefs and practices for reasons of, for example, state security or stability of an institution, as opposed to accepting positively that they have liberty of conscience to hold their beliefs, etc.

4. Repressive Tolerance*.* Herbert Marcuse (1969) argued that toleration only masks and cements social exclusion. He urged for the suppression of objectionable views, not their toleration. Wendy Brown (2006) argues that tolerance can too easily hide and sometimes even legitimate violence and the misuse of power by those in authority. Too much emphasis on tolerance can become paternalistic, seeing strangers as 'other', as uncivilized, or needing civilization or needing to be 'taught' tolerance; there is an inevitable asymmetry between the tolerant power and the object of toleration.

While such latter views need to be taken account of as an antidote to paternalistic thinking, and it is true that an authority which tolerates could just as easily not tolerate, they would seem to run too much risk of losing something essential in the management of human relations; one has only to see the consequences of living in regimes where tolerance is not tolerated. Pure tolerance may never be achieved, but some tolerance is surely better than none. The point is that there needs to be a 'tolerance process', in which critical thinking and respectful judgment can take place in an atmosphere of debate and reasonably open communication, when issues

around what can and cannot be tolerated about different beliefs, practices and attitudes in people in our own and other cultures, are examined. Dare one say that a 'facilitating environment' for such open debate needs to be available?

One could envisage such a tolerance process consisting of the following broad steps:

1. Toleration is not just to be seen as an end-point but requires time to achieve. The very act of going through a process is in itself potentially tolerance promoting. It goes without saying that for this process to even begin, there would need to be an atmosphere of respectful debate and a wish to examine uncomfortable realities, including a natural ambivalence towards the very process itself. Obstacles to tolerance in the form of, for example intolerant states of mind leading to intolerant acts also need to be faced and named.

2. Toleration requires a movement from 'Object' to 'Subject' Tolerance. As I indicated, I am thinking here of the parallel with psychoanalytic treatment, where the analyst is part of a process of helping the patient become a subject.

3. Seeing the other as a subject, requires some self-reflection, where otherness in oneself is seen as part and parcel of being human. In Kristeva's words, 'How could one tolerate a foreigner if one did not know one was a stranger to oneself?'

4. With regard to the specific issue of how such a process may apply to the current refugee crisis, I have suggested that there is a complex interaction between the psychic homes of refugee and host. The refugee feels a stranger in a new environment, carrying within their own sense of psychic home (however ravaged by trauma) and the host may feel a fear of a loss of their secure sense of a psychic home as a result of being 'invaded' and 'enveloped' by all these strangers. The hope is that naming these anxieties can provide a framework for mutual adjustment on both sides, leading not to some perfect solution to the current crisis, but one that affords the hope of some positive way forward.

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