

Editorial

The Latin word *animal*, ‘a living being’, is derived from *anima*, which has its roots in the Greek word ἄνιμι – ‘that which breathes or blows’; ‘the air’; ‘a breeze or wind’; or the ‘air’ as in respiration; ‘fumes’; the ‘breath of life’; a ‘living being’; ‘souls’¹. Whence the title of Aristotle’s famous treatise Περὶ Ψυχῆς is rendered in Latin *De anima*. Thus, from the point of view of language, animality and psychoanalysis are discernibly related. However, although the etymology and cognates of ‘*anima*’ and ‘*psuchē*’ both, in the first instance, lead us back to the way the air upholds life, as discourses they take as their focus very different aspects of man’s composite nature or what we might call the ‘self’.

The history of the Greek concept of the *psuchē* has been written very differently over the years, and has, like many other aspects of ancient thought, been interpreted in the light of the intellectual fashions of the day². Nevertheless, it seems largely accepted that it underwent a development and a widening of meaning and derived its later sense from the merging of various originally quite distinct strands³. As we encounter the idea in the Homeric tradition, conflicting aspects are still partially present and a double signification is particularly defined. First, there is a general notion of *psuchē* as life, which is derived from its etymology *psuchō* (to breathe) and secondly, a more individualised idea of the spirit of the dead⁴. From the former comes the concept of a life force, that by virtue of which, as Aristotle later put it, anything living is alive (De an. 414a, 12; 414b, 32). Hence, animal life, including human life, as well as the life of plants. The latter notion probably comes from a more primitive belief that something remaining of the dead person could, under certain circumstances, be seen in the form of a ghost. Hence, in Homer the *psuchē* is the ‘breath of life’ or individual spirit that leaves the dying hero’s body. It seems to have no function in relation to the living except to leave at the moment of death. From this something else important emerges. We get a sense, that unlike the corpse, the *psuchē* is something in motion. It is the ‘emotional’ rather than the rational self. It is the seat of courage, passion, pity, anxiety, animal appetite. Burnet thought this was because in moments of passion we breathe more heavily. Look at horses, he says⁵. Dodds adds to this that *psuchē* could also refer to conscience intuition. A kind of non-rational perception⁶. Indeed, before Plato seldom,

¹ See Liddle, H.G. and Scott, R. (Eds.), *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1863), p. 23) and Smith, W., *A Smaller Latin-English Dictionary* (London: John Murray, 1968), p. 47). In both discourses there is a risk of dualism cf. Pierre Hadot, *Plotin ou la simplicité du regard* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1973), p. 158.

² From the nineteenth century on the literature is vast and the trends fairly transparent e.g. Murray, G. *Four Stages of Greek Religion* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1912); Otto, W. *Die Manen oder Von den Orformen des Totenglaubens* (Berlin: Verlag Von Julius Springer, 1923); Rohde, E. *Psyche: The Cult of Souls and the Belief in Immortality among the Greeks* (trans) W. B. Hillis (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925); and Snell, B. *The Discovery of the Mind* (trans) T. G. Rosenmeyer (New York: Harvard University Press, 1953).

³ Cf. Claus, D.B. *Toward the Soul: An Enquiry into the Meaning of ψυχή before Plato* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); and Clarke, M.J. *Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer: A Study of Words and Myths* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2000).

⁴ Jaeger makes the point against that of Walter Otto who had argued that the Homeric view resulted from the experience of seeing ghosts. His criticisms of Otto largely follow those of Bickel, E. *Homerischer Seelenglaube. Geschichtliche Grundzüge menschlicher Seelenvorstellungen. Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft. 1. Jahr. Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse. Heft 7* (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1926). See Jaeger, W. *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers. The Gifford Lectures 1936* (Oxford at The Clarendon Press, 1947), p. 81.

⁵ Burnet, J. *The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul. Second Annual Philosophical Lecture. Henriette Hertz Trust* (Oxford University Press, 1916), p. 13.

⁶ E.R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), p. 139.

if ever, does *psuchē* refer to the seat of reason. According to Jaeger, the notions of consciousness and animal life were never originally conceived as a unity. The former being designated not by *psuchē* but by *thumos* which takes the meaning of ‘the sensory and intellectual soul’ well before it merely signifies anger⁷. However, Jaeger is, perhaps, too emphatic about this distinction. Kirk makes the point, in his discussion of the notion of soul in Diogenes of Apollonia, that the terms were clearly blurred⁸. But a merging and overlapping of the meanings ascribed to these two terms seems to be crucial to the development of the later notion of the *psuchē*.

According to the doxographical summary of Aetius, Anaximenes compared cosmic air (*pneuma*) and the breath-soul (*psuchē*). ‘As our soul, he says, being air holds us together and controls us, so does wind [or breath] and air enclose the whole world’ (Aet. 1, 3.4; Diels Anax. B1, 17-18). Kirk thinks this cannot be a direct quotation because of the language and finds the comparison unclear. Be that as it may, three things are to be said on this. First, that the mention of *psuchē* here is, in itself important, as apart from a reference to Thales (Arist. De an 405a, 19), it is the first Presocratic statement on the soul to survive⁹. Secondly, that the idea of the soul ‘holding together’ the body, from the inside, has no parallel before Aristotle in any Greek source, though Anaximenes ‘could certainly have held that the soul possesses, ἔχει, the body, meaning that it permeates the whole of it (cf. Heraclitus fr. 67a), and possibly, even, that it controls it’¹⁰. And thirdly, that ‘this is the first extant use of the word πνεῦμα, which became common...both for breath and gust of wind’¹¹. Jaeger noticed that by maintaining that air controlled the cosmos and held it together in the same way that the *psuchē* controls our bodies, Anaximenes was, in fact, animizing the *apeiron* of Anaximander (Aetius 1, 3. 4; Diels 3B2. 17-18)¹². Thus, he asserts that ‘he clearly feels that the divine nature of the *apeiron* should include the power of thought’¹³. Heraclitus abandoned the early view that *psuchē* was made of breath in favour of ‘another popular conception’ that it was made of *aither*¹⁴. From this he developed quite an elaborate psychological theory of the soul. In fr. B. 45, Heraclitus refers to the limits of the soul¹⁵ and says that *psuchē* has profound *logos*. ‘Pythagoras clearly refers to the essential self, the person, while also exploiting the sense of “life principle”. Ion 258 suggests that Pythagoras envisaged a blessed fate for some human souls after death’¹⁶. While Democritus suggests psychological motives for ‘right conduct in “conviction, understanding and knowledge” (fr.181)...in “respect of oneself” – and not just other people’s opinion – as a “law for the soul” (fr. 264)’¹⁷.

⁷ Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E. and Shofield, M. *The Presocratic Philosophers. A Critical History with a Selection of Texts* (Cambridge: CUP, 1984), p. 159.

⁸ Kirk *ibid.* p. 444.

⁹ *Ibid.* pp.95, 97 n.2 and 161; cf. DL 1, 24 on what Kirk describes as the Stoic perversion of Thales’ conception of ψυχή that the soul was immortal, as Thales would have been able to distinguish the human ψυχή from the life-force as a whole.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 160.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² See the commentary by Kirk (1984), pp. 109-11, 158-62.

¹³ Jaeger *op. cit.* p. 36.

¹⁴ According to Plato in Tim. 58d and Phaed. 109a-110b, it is the purest form of ἀήρ. In Crat. 410b he gives an etymology. Goldschmidt discusses this within his study of ‘natural language’ in *Essai sur le ‘Cratyle’. Contribution à l’histoire de la pensée de Platon* (Paris : Vrin, 1982), p. 132. Aristotle makes it the *quinta essentia*. Cicero in Acad. Post. 1, 7, 26 suggests that νοῦς is composed of αἰθήρ. See the detailed discussion in Kirk *op.cit.* p. 204-5 and n.2.

¹⁵ Ψυχῆς πείρατα; cf. Heraclitus fr. B115.

¹⁶ Kirk *op.cit.* p. 220.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 433.

Although Plato exhibits a certain condescension towards Orphic-Pythagorean thought, it is improbable that the early dialogues are not marked, to a certain extent, by a shared understanding of the *psuchē*¹⁸. We see this especially in relation to the notion of reincarnation and in its dependent doctrine of purification (*katharsis*) (Plat. Apol. 33e, 2; Phaed. 62b, 5; 63c, 1; 69c, 4)¹⁹. Allied to this is Plato's theory of *anamnēsis*. That which is recollected, being a knowledge not of a former incarnation but of the intelligible forms (*eidē*) (Plat. Phaed. 65a-67b)²⁰. The *psuchē*, as the forms, being invisible, immortal and intelligible, it is the faculty through which we know them (ibid. 78b-79b). Hence it is the recollection of the form of beauty, glimpsed before the incarnation of the soul, that awakens desire in the lover. Thus, recollection is for the first time connected to *erōs*²¹. Later, Plato developed a tripartite theory of the *psuchē* dividing it into the rational (*logistikōn*), the spirited (*thumoeides*) and appetitive (*epithumētikon*) (Plat. Rep. IV, 435e-444e; IX, 580d-581a; Phaedr. 246a-b, 253c-255b; Tim. 69d-72d)²². Sometimes these seem like three separate souls. Aristotle refers to them as 'parts' but describes them as faculties²³. According to Peters, from the *Republic* on, as the functions of the *psychē* are expanded, the *logistikōn* begins to 'take on the characteristics of the unitary *psyche* of the *Phaedo*. It is divine, created by the *demigourgos* (Tim. 41c-d), lodged in the head (ibid. 44d), vouchsafed a prenatal vision of the *eidē* (*Phaedrus* 247b-248b, *Tim.* 41e-42a), and subject to cyclic *palingenēsia* (*Phaed.* 248c-249d; *Tim.* 42b-d)'.

Aristotle's influential view, presented in his *De anima*, that the soul is that thing by virtue of which every living thing is alive (De an. 414, 32) is – perhaps more than is often realised – largely consistent with Plato²⁴. Some living things, however, are more complex than others. Thus, Aristotle goes to some considerable length to order plants and animals according to their powers of nutrition and reproduction. He presents a complete theory of the soul, referring to an 'ensouled' body in contrast to a corpse; a body that is not alive, strictly speaking, is not a man at all. It is from the starting point of the individual that he goes on to discuss the faculties of living beings. These manifold faculties amount to the power to effect change (De an. 433). He describes here, in careful detail, the way they progress from the nutritive to the sensitive to the rational, this last being the distinctive faculty of man. The *psuchē* being the form of the body, as sight is the form of the eye. Form needs matter, as the eye needs sight. Without sight, the eye is no longer really an eye because it cannot see. The *psuchē* is that which actualises the body. But there is one exception for Aristotle and that is the activity of *nous* (*intellectus* in

¹⁸ E.g. Plat. Charm. 156d-157a in connection with the necessity of treating body and soul as a unity, in order to achieve a cure. This contrasts with three oft cited passages where the body is described both as a tomb (*sēma*) or index of the soul and as that which in some way signifies (*sēmainei*) the soul (Gorg. 493a; Crat. 400c; and Phaed. 250c). Here he mistakenly attributes the origin of this idea to the Orphic tradition and conflates it with the rather different notion of the body as a prison. It is more likely Pythagorean rather than Orphic in origin. See Courcelle, P. (1965), *Tradition platonicienne et traditions chrétiennes du corps-prison* (Phédon, 62b; Cratyle 400c) *Revue des études latines* XLIII: 406-43 and (1966), *Le corps-tombeau* *Revue des Études Anciennes* LXVIII: 101-22.

¹⁹ See Burnet 1960 op. cit. 6.

²⁰ Cf. the comments in Peters, F.E. *Greek Philosophical Terms. A Historical Lexicon* (New York: New York University Press, 1967).

²¹ On how this is a reversal of the direction of movement found in the Symposium see North, H. *Sophrosyne. Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature* (Sophron Editor, 2019), p. 207 n. 53.

²² Plato's tripartite soul was to have an impact on the way medieval theologians thought about the Trinity. See Bell, D. (1980), *The Tripartite Soul and the Image of God in the Latin Tradition* *Recherches De Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 47: 16–52.

²³ Peters op. cit. p. 173.

²⁴ Cf. Jaeger, W. *Aristotle* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1948).

Thomas²⁵). This is because thought does not seem to depend on the body in the same way as other activities and this exception allows for the possibility of immortality. Commenting on the *De anima*, Heidegger says that ‘the “soul” which makes up the Being of man has *ἀίσθησις* and *νόησις* among its ways of Being’²⁶. This he sees as a line of thought coming directly from Parmenides, though this is by no means direct²⁷, and one which St Thomas will later take up in his discussion of *transcendentia* (De ver. Ia, 1c)²⁸.

The longevity of a number of aspects of the Platonic idea of the soul is attested in many later authors. Plotinus, though treating Plato’s ideas liberally, nevertheless remains indebted to his master for the complex development of the interrelated notions of *nous*, *logos* and soul²⁹. A similarly sweeping statement might be made of Stoic writers with their particularly strong emphasis on rationality as the determining feature of human life³⁰. In Clement of Alexandria, Origen and Augustine and many other patristic writers Platonic and neo-Platonic thinking becomes intertwined with biblical notions. In the Septuagint *psuchē* and *pneuma* are used, respectively, to translate the Hebrew *נֶפֶשׁ* (*nepesh*) and *רוּחַ* (*ruah*). Both words seem, however, to be used fairly indiscriminately to describe the whole inner man³¹. This mirrors closely the overlapping we found in classical Greek and looking forward, reflects the Vulgate’s rendering of *anima* and *spiritus*.

At least from the time of Socrates, throughout late antiquity, the medieval period and beyond, the conception of an ‘inner life’ is predicated on a notion of the soul³². The care of the soul being a ‘fundamental Socratic doctrine’ or ‘rule’³³. There are innumerable aphorisms and

²⁵ Kenny points out that *intellectus*, normally translated ‘intellect’ or ‘understanding’ in Thomas’ Latin can mean more generally ‘think’. Kenny, A. Aquinas (Oxford: OUP, 1980), p. 61.

²⁶ Heidegger, M. *Being and Time* (trans) J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 14.

²⁷ Fr 1.1-2 in Coxon, A.H. *The Fragments of Parmenides. A critical text with introduction, translation, the ancient testimonia and a commentary* (Assen/Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1986), pp. 45, 157.

²⁸ ‘Thomas is engaged in the task of deriving “*transcendentia*” – those characteristics of Being which lie beyond every possible way in which an entity may be classified as coming under some generic kind of subject-matter (every *modus specialis entis*), and which belong necessarily to anything, whatever it may be. Thomas has to demonstrate that the *verum* is such a *transcendens*. He does this by invoking an entity which, in accordance with its very manner of Being, is properly suited ‘to come together with’ entities of any sort whatever. This distinctive entity, the *ens quod natum est convenire cum omni ente*, is the soul (*anima*).’ Ibid.

²⁹ There is probably no better summary than that of J.M. Rist, *Plotinus. The Road to Reality* (Cambridge: CUP, 1977), p. 85-102.

³⁰ See the review of the body-soul relationship among Stoic philosophers by A.A. Long, *Soul and body in Stoicism* (1982) *Phronesis* 27 (1): 34-57.

³¹ For a fair overview of Old and New Testament usage see Goodwin, D. R. (1881), On the use of *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*, and Connected Words in the Sacred Writings *Journal of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis* 1 (2): 73-86.

³² Jaeger notices, precisely, that what was new in the thought of Socrates was the idea of an ‘inner world’, *Paideia. The Ideals of Greek Culture* II (Oxford: OUP, 1963, p. 40).

³³ Burnet says that Socrates seems to be the first to have argued that ‘care of the soul’ was the chief duty of man ‘(ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὅτι φρονιμώτατη καὶ βελτίστη ἔσται), sometimes more briefly expressed as ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς or ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ, whence the importance of the argument in Alc. 130a. 7 sqq. that the self (αὐτός) is the soul (ψυχή)’. For the phraseology Burnet lists Plat. Apol. 29 e,1; 30 b, 2; 31b,5; 36c,6; 39d,7; 41e,4; Laches 186a,5; Phaed. 278e, 5 sqq; cf. Isocr. 15, 290: Burnet, J. (ed) *Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito* Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 123, 171.

exhortations, pagan and Christian alike³⁴, to take care of one's soul³⁵, to train one's soul³⁶, or putting it synonymously, to be attentive to oneself (*prosochē*), to concentrate upon oneself³⁷, to make a thorough investigation of oneself (*skepsis*)³⁸ and to withdraw into oneself³⁹. This correspondence of terms reflects the way that in the *Apology*, *psuchē* signifies the self as opposed to the body and other outer things, like wealth, which are considered 'belongings' in the most literal sense of the term (Plat. Apol. 36e, 5)⁴⁰. Freud points out that '*Psyche* is a Greek word that is rendered in German *Seele*'⁴¹ and repeatedly uses the words interchangeably⁴². Furthermore, the Freudian ego seems to correspond to Plato's reason, though it is more limited, and the id to the *epithumētikon*⁴³. 'Turn your eyes inward, look into your own depths, learn to first know yourself'⁴⁴. These are Freud's words but they could be those of Plotinus, Seneca or Augustine or a host of other spiritual writers. It may not be in doubt then that despite the efforts of his English translators, psychoanalysis shares antiquity's concern to draw our attention to the soul or to what might, without ambiguity, reasonably be called the spiritual life. That is to say, to the life we live unconsciously and to spiritual exercises which cultivate an inner life. Moreover, in 1909, Freud suggested that psychoanalysis was akin to the practice of spiritual

³⁴ To some extent this was the result of the way Platonism continued in Eastern Christianity and in the West through Augustine's reading of Plotinus. See Ivánka, E. *Plato Christianus* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1964) and Cary, P. *Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self* (Oxford: OUP, 2000).

³⁵ E.g. επιμελεῖσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς (Plat. Apol. 30A-B).

³⁶ E.g. ἄσκησις τῆς ψυχῆς (Clem. Alex. Str. VII. 893) in *Clement of Alexandria. Miscellanies Book VII* (eds) F.J. Hort and J.B. Mayor. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1902. Clement is an interesting example, as he draws heavily on Philo. On Clement's use of Philo see Van Den Hoek, J. L. *Clement of Alexandria and his Use of Philo in the Stromateis. An Early Christian reshaping of a Jewish model*. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

³⁷ E.g. προσέχειν τοῖς αὐτοῦ πράγμασι (Dio Chrys. Dis. XX, II. 261.4-9) in H. von Arnim, *Dionis Prusaensis quem vocant Chrysostomum quae extant omnia II* (Berlin, 1993).

³⁸ E.g. Philo, Leg. III. 18 ; cf. Hadot, P. *Exercices Spirituels et Philosophie Antique* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1987).

³⁹ E.g. ἀναχῶρεῖν εἰς ἑαυτόω. This becomes Seneca's famous dictum, *ad te recedere*. On the question of *anachōrēsis* in antiquity see the study by Père Festugière, *Personal Religion among the Greeks* p. 53-67 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954); on the contemplative life see Festugière, A.J. *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1950).

⁴⁰ Cf. the note in Burnet op. cit. 1960, p. 154. See also Solmsen, F. (1983), Plato and the Concept of the Soul (*Psyche*): Some Historical Perspectives *Journal of the History of Ideas* 44 (3): 355-67.

⁴¹ Thus, Freud writes '*Psyche ist ein griechisches Wort und lautet in deutscher Übersetzung Seele. Psychische Behandlung heißt dem nach Seelenbehandlung. Man könnte also meinen, daß darunter verstanden wird: Behandlung der krankhaften Erscheinungen des Seelenlebens. Dies ist aber nicht die Bedeutung dieses Wortes. Psychische Behandlung will vielmehr besagen: Behandlung von der Seele aus, Behandlung - seelischer oder körperlicher Störungen - mit Mitteln, welche zunächst und unmittelbar auf das Seelische des Menschen einwirken*' (Freud, S. [1890]) *Psychische Behandlung (Seelenbehandlung) Die Gesundheit* (ed.) R. Kossmann and J. Weiss 1: 368-84. Stuttgart, Berlin and Leipzig: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft. (Eng. trans) *Psychical (or Mental) Treatment (1890) The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume VII (1901-1905)*: 283. The question of the mistranslation of *psyche* as *mind* is discussed by Bettelheim who thought this distortion was to try to get Freud's ideas accepted by the medical profession, especially in America, by making it sound more 'scientific'. Berke adds to this the idea that it also served to conceal the Jewish origins of Freud's ideas and his interest in the soul. See Bettelheim, B. (1983). *Freud and Man's Soul*, London: Chatto and Windus; Berke, J. (2015). *The Hidden Freud. His Hassidic Roots*. London: Karnac.

⁴² Freud had studied Greek during his eight years (1865-1873) at the Leopoldstädter Gymnasium in Vienna. Among the masters was the classics philologist Joseph Nahrhaft. In the university entrance examination Freud had to translate from Greek to German thirty-three verses of *Oedipus Rex* and his translation was considered the best. The next day he passed the oral examination, *summa cum laude*, cf. Knoepfmacher, H. (1979). Sigmund Freud in High School *American Imago* 36 (3): 287-300.

⁴³ The huge divergence of interpretation of the structure of the tripartite *psuchē* can be seen by comparing the analysis of Kahn with that of Taylor. See Kahn, C. H. (1987), Plato's Theory of Desire *The Review of Metaphysics* 41 (1): 77-103 and Taylor, C., *Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989), p.115-26.

⁴⁴ Freud [1917a] SE XVII: 142.

direction, a practice that owed much to the Greek philosophical tradition⁴⁵. ‘*Die katholischen Seelsorger*’ being our predecessors in psychoanalysis (*Unsere Vorgänger in der Psychoanalyse*)⁴⁶. To say this is not to diminish the importance of eighteenth and nineteenth century influences on the development of Freud’s thought⁴⁷, perhaps most notably that of Schelling⁴⁸ but rather, albeit prosaically, to emphasise the point that Freud’s ideas emerged within a long tradition of thinking about inwardness. Something rarely, if ever, denied by those with more than a casual interest in the history of ideas, though nonetheless often overlooked.

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Abbreviations

Aquinas De ver.	S. Thomae Aquinatis. <i>Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate</i> (ed) R.M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1949).
Arist. De an.	Aristotle. <i>On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath</i> (trans) W. S. Hett. Loeb Classical Library 288. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957.
Cic. Acad. Post.	Cicero. <i>On the Nature of the Gods. Academics</i> (trans) H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 268. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933.
DL I.	Diogenes Laertius. <i>Lives of Eminent Philosophers</i> Volume I: Books 1-5 (trans) R. D. Hicks. Loeb Classical Library 184. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925.
Heraclitus fr.	<i>Die Fragmente der Vorokratiker</i> (ed) H. Diels Vol II. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1906, 61-
Philo. Leg.	<i>Philon d’Alexandrie. Legum Allegoriae</i> I-III (ed) C. Mondésert. Paris: Cerf, 1962.
Plat. Alc	Plato. <i>Charmides. Alcibiades I and II. Hipparchus. The Lovers. Theages. Minos. Epinomis</i> (trans) W. R. M. Lamb. Loeb Classical Library 201. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927.
Plat. Apol.	Plato. <i>Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus</i> (trans) H. N. Fowler. Loeb Classical Library 36. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914.
Plat. Charm.	Plato. <i>Charmides. Alcibiades I and II. Hipparchus. The Lovers. Theages. Minos. Epinomis</i> (trans) W. R. M. Lamb. Loeb Classical Library 201. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927.
Plat. Crat.	Plato. <i>Cratylus. Parmenides. Greater Hippias. Lesser Hippias</i> (trans) H. N. Fowler. Loeb Classical Library 167. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926.

⁴⁵ Hadot op.cit. (1973 p. 115).

⁴⁶ Letter from Freud to Oskar Pfister 18th March 1909: *Sigmund Freud Oskar Pfister Briefe 1909-1939* (eds.) E. Freud and H. Meng 18. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fisker Verlag.

⁴⁷ Mills sees a close similarity between Hegel’s philosophy of spirit and Freud’s notion of soul. But there are at least three difficulties with this comparison. For the most part the resemblance seems to be restricted to the unconscious; Hegel assumes a sequential evolving soul; and the first-hand evidence of Freud himself for a Greek provenance for his notion. See Mills, J. (2000), Hegel and Freud on Psychic Reality *Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis* 12 (1): 159-83.

⁴⁸ See the perceptive study by Matt Ffytche, *The Foundation of the Unconscious. Schelling, Freud and the Birth of the Modern Psyche* (Cambridge: CUP, 2012).

- Plat. Gorg. Plato. *Lysis. Symposium. Gorgias* (trans) W. R. M. Lamb. Loeb Classical Library 166. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925.
- Plat. Ion Plato. Statesman. *Philebus. Ion* (trans) H. N. Fowler and W. R. M. Lamb. Loeb Classical Library 164. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925.
- Plat. Laches Plato. *Laches. Protagoras. Meno. Euthydemus* (trans) W. R. M. Lamb. Loeb Classical Library 165. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924.
- Plat. Phaedr. Plato. *Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus* (trans) H. N. Fowler. Loeb Classical Library 36. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914.
- Plat. Phaed. Plato. *Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus* (trans) H. N. Fowler. Loeb Classical Library 36. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914.
- Plat. Tim. Plato. *Timaeus. Critias. Cleitophon. Menexenus. Epistles* (trans) R. G. Bury. Loeb Classical Library 234. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929.